The power of remand is inherent in the power of the Appellate Authority.

1.The appellant in this appeal, applied to the Tahsildar, Kottarakara for settlement of the record of rights. His application was allowed; against which Respondents 3 to 5 herein filed an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer. That Officer remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for fresh disposal. It is said that the remand was with observations against the appellant and and in favour of the Respondents. It was to quash this order of remand that the writ petition was filed by the appellant. Before the learned judge it was objected by Respondents 3 to 5 that in pursuance of the order of remand, the Land Tribunal in separate proceedings had dismissed an application for purchase of rights under S.72B of the Land Reforms Act, and that the dismissal of the said application would be a bar to the application at the instance of the appellant for preparation of the record of rights. This objection was upheld by the learned judge; and in view of this objection, the learned judge took the view that the proceedings for preparation of record of rights had become infructuous. The learned judge observed:

"It has to be found that the record of rights prepared by the Tahsildar might be a piece of evidence that could be produced in proceedings before the Land Tribunal. But the Tahsildar is not competent to ignore the decision of the Land Tribunal or the Appellate Authority on questions of tenancy rights. In this view the proceedings before the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer having become infructuous they are to be quashed, and I do so without prejudice to the right of the petitioner or respondents 3 to 5 to move the Tahsildar again for the preparation of record of right in respect of the lands involved in the case. The writ petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs."

2. We find it difficult to sustain the judgment of the learned judge on the ground that the proceedings for settlement of record of rights had been rendered infructuous by certain separate proceedings before the Land Tribunal in regard to the purchase of landlord's rights under S.72B of the Act. To so bold in the appellant's writ petition to quash the order of remand made by the appellate authority, seems to us to require examination. But we do not pursue this line of enquiry, as we are satisfied that even dealing with the appellant's writ petition on the merits, there are no grounds to allow it and it has only to be dismissed.

3. The only grievance that the appellant had in his writ petition was that the Revenue Divisional Officer had no power of remand in dealing with the appeal from the order of the Tahsildar allowing an application for preparation of record of rights. Counsel drew our attention to R.28, sub-rule (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Tenancy Rules, which deals with the procedure for disposing of an appeal, against an application to settle the record of rights. We think it unnecessary to extract the rule. It was argued that the rule contemplates only a dismissal of the appeal or a direction to the Tahsildar to make such additions, alterations, deletions or modifications as are deemed necessary by the Revenue Divisional Officer. We find it a little difficult to understand how this latter power of direction to the Tahsildar can be exercised except by or through an order of remand. But that apart, there is enough authority to hold, and we have no hesitation to hold, that a power of remand is inherent in the power of the Appellate Authority. Were authority needed for the proposition, we have it in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1962 KLT. 505). In view of the said principle, the appellant can have no grievance against the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and his writ petition had only to be dismissed. The learned judge was wrong in quashing the whole proceedings to settle record of rights.

We allow this appeal, to the extent to which the learned judge quashed t