The judgment establishes the requirement of animus possidendi and corpus possessions to prove occupation under S.11(4)(v) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

1. The revision petitioner had 5 or 6 vegetable shops in different parts of Trivandrum. His business failed. He then surrendered possession of all the rooms in which the said shops were run except the one owned by the respondent herein. He was not carrying on any business in this room from the beginning of May to December 18th, 1975 on which date the respondent applied to the Rent Control Court to evict him on the ground that he ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause. The Appellate Authority and Revisional Court agreed in holding that he failed to substantiate his case that he was ill during May to August end and that thereafter the respondent obstructed him from doing business in the room in question in so far as there is no evidence in that behalf except that of the revision petitioner. This is a finding of fact and is, therefore, beyond challenge in this Court.

2. It is contended that as held by the Rent Control Court the revision petitioner must beheld to be occupying the room in question though he was physically absent therefrom for a continuous period of six months since be has the intention to possess and occupy the same. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on Wigley v. Leigh (1950) 2 K.B. 305 C.A The facts of that case reveal that a caretaker was installed to look after the building, that he kept if ready for occupation at any time and that the evidence made it clear that Mrs. Leigh, the statutory tenant, intended to return there to live when her health improved, though after leaving England in 1945 because of pulmonary tuberculosis and on medical advice, she had resided in the house only once, for three months in the summer of 1947. Therefore it was held that she was in occupation of the house as a statutory tenant. This case is an instance of the application of the formula, animus possidendi and corpus possessions, evolved and used by Asquith L. J. in Brown v. Brash (!948) 1 A.E.R. 922 C.A. There Lord Asquith said :

"We are of opinion that a "non-occupying" tenant prima facia forfeits bis status as a statutory tenant. But what is meant by "non-occupying"? The term clearly cannot cover every tenant who for however short a time, or however necessary a purpose, or with whatever intention as regards returning, absents himself from the demised premises. To retain possession or occupation for the purpose of retaining protection the tenant cannot be compelled to spend 24 hours in all weathers under his own roof for 365 days in the year. x x x x x Nevertheless, absence may be sufficiently prolonged or un-intermittent to compel the inference, prima facie of a cessor of possession or occupation. The question is one of fact and of degree."

and formulated a rule of practical application, namely, that, if the tenant proves his animus possidendi (intention to possess) and a corpus possessions viz. some visible state of affairs in which the animus possidendi finds expression such as leaving the building in the hands of a caretaker or the tenant leaving his furniture in the buildings not some token pieces of furniture, but the tenant leaving the house substantially furnished so that at any time he can return and reside there, the presumption of cessation of occupation arising from the physical absence of the tenant from the premises will stand rebutted. The Court of Appeal applied this formula, besides in the wigley case cited by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner in Dixon v. Tommis and Another 1952(1) A.E.R. 725 C A. and in Beck v. Scholz 1953 (1) Q.B. 570 C.A. In Dixon's case Evershed M.R. in his concurring judgment pointed out that'if the tenant does not in the eye of law retain his possession, an intention, however truthfully and sincerely entertained, to return there at some future date will not suffice'. The same Master of the Rolls in Beck v. Scholz observed:

"But as Jenkips L. J. observed, the mere use of the phrase animus possidendi requires