The main legal point established in the judgment is the inapplicability of the bar of limitation and the differences in the scope and content of the surcharge provisions under the Madras and Kerala Acts.

1. The judgment of the learned judge has got to be affirmed, although for different reasons. The writ petition which was allowed by the learned judge was to quash an order of surcharge passed against the writ petitioner, the ex-President of the Birikolam Multipurpose Cooperative Society, a Society governed, at the relevant time, by the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. For having allowed 32 loans to become time-barred certain enquiries were" instituted and proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by notice dated 28-3-1969 under S.49 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 2 51969. The Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 came into force on 15 5 1969. Thereafter by Ext, P1 order dated 2511972 the petitioner was informed that he was solely responsible for allowing the loans to become time-barred; that the loans are benami in some cases, and, in others, the petitioners had appropriated the amounts for his own use by not giving receipt and bringing the amount of the loans into accounts of the Society. The Deputy Registrar recorded his conclusion that the total amount of the time-barred loans was Rs. 2729/-which had to be made good by the petitioner. In exercise of the powers under S.68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act he ordered that the sum of Rs. 2058/-(after adjustment of the share capital of Rs. 671/-) be surcharged against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal (Ext. P3) which was dismissed as not maintainable by Ext. P4 order. The writ petition was to quash Exts. P1 and P4 and for other appropriate reliefs.

2. The learned judge quashed the orders on the short ground that the basis of the charge, namely, that the petitioner had allowed the loans to become time-barred, was not sustainable, as the bar of limitation would not be applicable to Tribunals as ruled by this Court in Thilakan v. M. C. V. Co-operative Society (1974 KLT. 657), following the decision of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court Hubli (AIR. 1969 SC. 335). If the bar of limitation was not applicable, the basis of the charge that the petitioner had allowed the loans to become time-barred, could not, it was argued, be sustained. This argument was accepted by the learned judge who held that in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of this Court, the basis of the charge was unsustainable. Ext. P1 order was accordingly quashed.

3. Writ Appeal No. 12 of 1976 is filed by the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and the State of Kerala against the learned judge's judgment; and W. A. No. 19 of 1976 has been filed by the Co-operative society itself. The contention urged in these Writ Appeals is that the learned judge's reasoning and conclusion to hold that the basis of the charge is unsustainable is fallacious. It was argued that the proceedings were initiated under the Madras Act and would be governed by the provisions of the said Statute, and that R.15 of the Rules framed under the said Act is specific on the question of limitation. The said Rule enacts:

"XV. (1) The reference to the Registrar of any dispute under S.51 of the Act shall be in writing.

(1-A) The period of limitation for referring a dispute touching the business of a registered society to the Registrar under sub-section (1) of S.51 of the Act shall be regulated by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court:

Provided that a dispute between (i) the society or its committee, and (ii) any past committee, any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, (shall, where the dispute relates to any act or omission on the part of the society or its committee, or any any past committee, any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any decea