The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for academic disciplinary proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, with a focus on substantial compliance rather than unduly strict standards.

1. The appeal is against the judgment of a learned judge of this Court to quash the order of suspension from the College passed against the two writ petitioners and the order of expulsion from the hostel passed against them, in view of their involvement in the ragging incidents of the Government Engineering College, Trichur during the year 1975. The ragging incidents complained of were on the 5th and 6th November, 1975. A preliminary enquiry was done by the Warden of the hostel who was a Professor in the College. Charges were framed and served on the students concerned and their statements in answer to the charge framed were also taken. An enquiry was conducted by two Professors of the College, one of them being the warden himself. Victims of ragging were examined in the presence of the writ petitioners and were cross-examined by them. At the end of the enquiry a report was submitted which was considered by the College Council and by Ext. R2 proceedings the College Council accepted the enquiry report. and passed the proceedings leading to the suspension of the petitioners till the next semester in June 1976, and to their expulsion from the College hostel. In Ext. R2 proceedings the College Council stated as follows:

"(i) Based on the enquiry commission's report and other evidences it was recommended that the following students (who were kept under suspension from 6-11-1975) may be suspended from the College till the beginning of the next semester in June 1976 and permanently dismissed from the Engineering College Hostel as a punishment for the ragging incidents.

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2. The learned judge who heard the writ petition was of the view that the College Council had referred to the Commission's Report "and other evidence" in support of its finding, that there was nothing to show what the "other evidence" looked into by the Council was; and that in so far as the "other evidence" was kept secret and not disclosed or made clear either to the writ petitioners or to the Court, the principle of natural justice had been violated and the resultant action of suspension and expulsion cannot be sustained.

3. We are unable to sustain the reasoning or the judgment of the learned Judge. We think that in the circumstances and against the background of the facts which we have detailed, the College Council's reference to the Commissioner's Report and "other evidence" can only have reference to the Enquiry Report and to the evidence collected at the enquiry. We do not think it is reasonable to understand that the College Council referred to and acted upon certain undisclosed and secret evidence. There is no foundation in the pleadings for coming to such a conclusion. The files were made available to us by the learned Government Pleader. And, we are satisfied, having regard to the nature of the complaint that had to be enquired into, and in particular, to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Hira Nath v. Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi (AIR. 1973 SC. 1260) and by the recent decision of this Court in O.P. Nos. 2740, 2741, 2742 of 1978 etc., 1979 KLT 45 that the enquiry has been fairly conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice which have been recognised to have application in this sphere of enquiries. The learned judge has referred to the decision in Glynn v. Keele University (1971 (1) WLR 487). The applicability of the rules of natural justice in matters of academic discipline has come in for a good amount of discussion. As Professor Wade remarks in his 'Administrative Law' (4th Edn. P. 478), the Courts have in general held that academic disciplinary proceedings require the observance of the principles of natural justice, but equally they have refused to apply unduly strict standards, provided the proceedings are substantially fair. In the English Courts, the pronouncement in Herring Templeman (1973 (3) A.E.R. 569) has highlighted this aspect. The principle of the decision in some of the earlier decisions, ca