The principle of res judicata is applicable to adjudication by tribunals, and the principle of 'might and ought' embodied in Explanation IV to S.11 of the CPC. does not directly arise for consideration on the facts of the present revision petition.

1. This revision petition has come on before a Full Bench to consider two principal questions that appeared to arise for determination, viz. (1) the applicability of the principle of res judicata, and in particular, the principle of 'might and ought' embodied in Explanation IV to S.11 of the C. P. C. to proceedings before the Land Tribunal under the Kerala Land Reforms Act; and (2) the question whether the status of a tenant who applies for purchase of kudikidappu has to be judged with reference to the date of the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 i. e.111970 or with respect to the dale of making the application The latter part of the first question does not actually arise on the facts; and the second question does not fall for consideration in view of our answer to the first part of the first question.

2. The revision is by the unsuccessful petitioner who applied for purchase of kudikidappu rights under S.80-B of the Land Reforms Act. The application was allowed by the Land Tribunal, Kasaragod. An appeal from she order of the Tribunal was allowed by the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Kozhikode, and the application for purchase of kudikidappu was directed to be dismissed. The reason,for the dismissal of the application was that two prior applications for purchase of the kudikidappu had been dismissed. O. A No. 381 of 1970 which was dismissed on 15 111971, and O. A. 881 of 1971 dismissed on 11-111971. The latter application was dismissed on the ground that the applicant-petitioner had 3.66 acres of land on registry under the rules for assignment of Government lands for settlement of agricultural labourers which had been assigned in his favour in 1966, and therefore was disentitled under the Act to claim the status of a kudikidappukaran.

3. Counsel for the revision-petitioner contended that the assignment of Government lands to him had been cancelled on 1181971 and this circumstance would make a difference which would enable him to maintain the present application and which would therefore enable him to steer clear of the bar of res judicata. He cited the decision of a learned judge of this Court in Thomas v. Punnoose (1973 KLT 1000) holding that neither the Land Reforms Act nor the Rules prohibited the filing of a second application and that the principles of resjudicata embodied in S.11 of the CPC. and other similar provisions do not apply to proceedings under the Act. An appeal was taken against the judgment of the learned judge and a Division Bench, of which one of us (myself) was a member, sustained the judgment of the learned judge on different grounds altogether and held that no question of res judicata would arise on the facts (vide the decision in Thomas v. Punnoose (1975 KLT. 406). The question of the applicability of the principle of res judicata should therefore be examined dehors the above decision.

4. In Kelappan v Anandan (1970 KLT. 510), a Division Bench of which I was a member, had surveyed somewhat exhaustively, the applicability of the principle of res judicata to suits. The principle laid down by us in the said decision was that where the question of resjudicata arose for consideration in suits, in civil courts, the provisions of S 11 of the CPC were both exclusive and exhaustive, and no resort could be had to any general doctrine of res judicata outside what was embodied in the Section. The decision again has no direct application to the question that falls for determination in this revision. In Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi & Others v. Banamati Sen & Others (AIR. 1953 S.C. 33), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider how far the proceedings taken in a Land Acquisition Court, can be said to be conclusive or to constitute res judicata in respect of matters decided by it, when the same question came up for decision later, in other proceedings. It was ruled that the condition regarding the competency of the former court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitations engrafted on the general rule