The court emphasized that the minimum term of imprisonment for certain offences reflects the gravity of the offence and the social abhorrence toward it, and that the Probation of Offenders Act does not apply to all cases, especially those with significant societal impact.

The petitioner is the accused in C.C. 198 of 1975 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Adoor. He was convicted for offences punishable under Ss. 55(a), (b) and (g) of the Kerala Abkari Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- under S. 55(b). In default of payment of fine, he is to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months. Separate sentence were not awarded under Section 55(a) and (g) of the Act. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Quilon. The conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal. The revision petitions is filed challenging the conviction and sentence.

2. The defence set up before the trial court and the appellate court was one of denial of the incident. An alternate contention was also raised that there is no sufficient material in the case to show that the building wherein the articles were found was in the possession of the petitioner. The courts below overruled the contention and held that on the evidence, it was clearly established that the petitioner did the acts alleged against him and that the building was owned by him and was in his possession. There are no proper reasons to interfere with the findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence.

3. The only plea put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that being a first offender, he may be released on probation of good conduct. The prayer is opposed. One of the objections raised on behalf of the State is based on the fact that S. 55 of the Abkari Act prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment. This objection has no force. The Probation of Offenders Act does not exclude from the operation offences for which a minimum sentence of imprisonment is fixed. Only offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act have been exempted from the operation of the Probation of Offenders Act. A similar objection was raised in connection with the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Supreme Court in Isher Das v. State of Punjab (AIR 1972 SC 1295) : (1972 Cri LJ 874) overruled the contention.

4. This does not, however mean that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act should be applied to all cases arising under the Abkari Act. Like adulteration of food, illicit manufacture of liquor is also an offence which has an adverse impact on society and on the economy of the State. Prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating liquor except for medicinal purpose is included in the Directive Principles of State Policy as will be seen from Art. 47 of the Constitution. A deliberate and calculated move to defy the provisions of the Abkari and Excise law prompted by profit making motive dose not deserve sympathetic consideration. The salutary provisions contained in the Probation of Offenders Act may not serve their purpose by indiscriminate application of its provision. The fact that a minimum term of imprisonment is fixed for a particular offence itself reveals the gravity of the offence. The provision reflects the social abhorrence toward the offence and the intention of the Legislature that offences of the kind should be stopped with a stern hand. While there is no prohibition in applying the principles of prohibition even in cases above referred to, it requires much circumspection in actual application to cases other than those coming under S. 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. In the instant case, the evidence shows that the petitioner was caught red-handed in the process of manufacture. There were utensils specially designed for manufacture of liquor. Large quantities of wash and liquor were taken into custody. From the materials available, it is evident that the person is not a casual offender and that it was not the first time that he was committing the act. Such a person does not deserve release on probation of good conduct. In cases like that of the petitioner, the denu