The central legal point established in the judgment is that the exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction under S.125(3) of the Land Reforms Act applies only to disputes between landlord and tenant, not disputes between tenants inter se.

1. The revision petitioner is the Ist defendant in O. S. No. 33 of 1973 of the Sub Court, Kasaragod, which is a suit for partition instituted by the 1st respondent. The plaintiff moved the trial court by I. A. No. 921 of 1976 for a reference of the question of tenancy to the Land Tribunal under S.125 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, (Act 1 of 1964) That application was allowed. Hence the present petition.

2. The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 are brothers. The other defendants are nephews and nieces. The plaintiff's case is that the father of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 died possessed of leasehold rights in the property which is the subject-matter of the suit for partition. It is contended by the plaintiff that he and the defendants are sharers of the leasehold rights, and consequently a partition has to be effected in respect of the rights held by the father and devolved upon his heirs. The plaintiff therefore moved the trial court for a reference under S.125(3) of the Land Reforms Act on the ground that the question of tenancy having been raised in his pleading the matter could be considered only by the Land Tribunal.

3. Counsel for the revision petitioner, Shri K. P. V. B. Ejman, contends that S.125(3) does not apply to the facts of this case as disclosed by the pleadings of the plaintiff. Shri. V. R. Venkitakrishnan on the other hand, submits that whenever a question of tenancy is raised in the pleadings that question can be examined only by the Land Tribunal as provided under S.25 (3). He relies upon the observations of this Court in Lissy v. Kuttan,1976.KLT. 571 (FB) at 574 (para. 3).

4. The facts disclosed in the plaint show that the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants is as regards the tenancy rights which the plaintiff's father was alleged to have held at the time of his death. The only question is whether those fights devolved upon the heirs so as to warrant a partition. The dispute is in fact one that has arisen inter se the tenants. No dispute arises between landlord and tenants.

5. The purpose of S 125 is to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court in regard to the questions arising between landlord and tenant The intention of the legislature is to confer upon the statutory authorities jurisdiction over matters involving readjustments of the rights of the landlord vis- a-vis the tenant In such matters, the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded to the extent indicated in the statute. 'Whenever' 'the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded, such exclusion has, to be by specific statutory provisions and not by implications. In a case where the dispute is unconnected with the claim of the tenant vis-a-vis the landlord, but relates to the rival claims of the several tenants inter se, S.125 (3) is not attracted and the jurisdiction of the civil court is unaffected.

6. The decision in Lissy v. Kuttan has no application to a case where the dispute is only as regards the rights of tenants inter se It is only in cases where the rights of a tenant vis-a-vis the landlord arise, does the principle in Lissy v. Kuttan apply. As pointed out by this Court in George v Chakkunni,1977 KLT. 865, a reference under S.125 is not made in all cases where the question of tenancy is raised by a party, but only in cases where the question really arises. As pointed out in Lissy v. Kuttan, the question of tenancy can arise only when the facts as disclosed in the pleadings point to a dispute between the landlord and tenant respecting the land over which the tenant claims the right. The pleadings in the present case do not disclose any such dispute so as to attract S.125.

In my view the impugned order is unsustainable. It is set aside. The civil revision petition is allowed. The parties will bear their respective costs.

Allowed.