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1977 Supreme(Ker) 232
Judges : K.BHASKARAN
JANARDHANAN - Appellant
Versus
AMMUKUTTY - Respondent
Case No : C. R. P. No. 2397 of 1975 B
Decided On : 10/13/1977
Advocates Appeared :
K. P. Dandapani; Sumathi Dandapani; For Petitioner M. V. Joseph; Government Pleader; For Respondents
The destruction of the but or homestead does not automatically deprive the kudikidappukaran of the right to purchase the kudikidappu under the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
Headnote:
Kerala Land Reforms Act - Kudikidappu - S.103, S.80-A, S.80-B, S.2(25), S.106, S.75, S.79, S.80-G, S.108 - The court discussed the definition of 'kudikidappu' and its requirements, the rights of kudikidappukaran, and the effect of destruction or demolition of the but or homestead on the kudikidappu. The court emphasized that the kudikidappukaran would not lose the right to purchase the kudikidappu unless disqualified under specific clauses of S.75(1) of the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved a dispute regarding the status of a kudikidappu after the destruction of the but or homestead. The widow of the occupant filed an application for purchase of the kudikidappu under S.80-B of the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the kudikidappu would not cease to be a kudikidappu merely due to the destruction of the but or homestead, and the kudikidappukaran would not lose the right to purchase the kudikidappu unless disqualified under specific clauses of S.75(1) of the Act.
Issues: The main issue was whether the destruction of the but or homestead would deprive the kudikidappukaran of the right to purchase the kudikidappu under S.80-A of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the kudikidappukaran would not lose the right to purchase the kudikidappu unless disqualified under specific clauses of S.75(1) of the Act.
Final Decision: The revision was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.
1. The short point that falls for decision in this revision under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, for short the Act, is whether, what was a kudikidappu, would cease to be one if and when the but or the homestead which was in existence there was destroyed or demolished after 1-1-1970, and, whether, for that reason, the kudikidappukaran would be deprived of his right to purchase the kudikidappu under S.80-A of the Act The Land Tribunal had allowed the application of the first respondent filed under S.80 B of the Act repelling the contentions of the revision petitioner that the application was not maintainable inasmuch as the but forming part of the kudikidappu was not in existence as on the date of the application; and the Appellate Authority has confirmed the decision of the Land Tribunal.
2. It is the admitted case that the 1st respondent is the widow of one Kunhimon, to whom the revision petitioners had entrusted the but which formed part of the kudikidappu and that they were in occupation of it till 3-6-1970. The Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority have disbelieved the version of the revision petitioners that the said Kunhimon had on 3-6-1970, as per Ext. D-1 receipt, surrendered the kudikidappu to them. It is not necessary here to investigate the case of the 1st respondent that the but was got demolished by the revision petitioners as a vindicative measure, with ulterior motives, when they bad temporarily left it on account of the illness of Kunhimon; the fact remains that the but which formed part of the kudikidappu was admittedly in their occupation till 3-6-1970. It was as the legal heir of deceased Kunhimon that the 1st respondent filed the application for purchase of the kudikidappu under S.80-B of the Act.
3. Mrs. Sumathi Dandapani, the counsel for the revision petitioners, submitted that "kudikidappu" as defined in clause (b) of S.2 (25) of the Act means not only the land, but also the homestead or the but permitted to be erected or occupied, together with the easements attached thereto; and in this case the admitted case being that the but occupied by the 1st respondent bad ceased to exist at the time when the application under S.80-B of the Act was made by her, the application could not have been treated as one for purchase of kudikidappu as defined in S.2 (25) of the Act.
4. Reliance was placed by the counsel on the following passage appearing in the last par graph at page 352 in Karunakaran Nair v. Ramakrishnan Nair (1966 KLT. 351):
"It follows that the expression "has constructed buildings" in S.106 connotes buildings that have been completed in construction and are continuing in existence at the relevant time."
This passage, in my view, has no relevance to the point in issue. What came up for decision before Madhavan Nair J. in the case cited was whether the provisions of S.106 would apply to cases where the building in question was not. in existence when the relevant provisions came into force. Going by the grammatical construction of the expression "has constructed buildings" occurring in S.106(1) of the Act, the Court held that in order to attract the relevant provisions of the Act the building should have been completed in construction and should also have been continuing in existence at the time when those pro visions came into force. It is the undisputed case here that the dwelling house was in existence on 1-1-1970 on which date Act 35 of 1969 came into force; and the dispute centres round the further question as to whether the 1st respondent had lost her right as kuclikidappukari for the reason that the but had ceased to be in existence by the time the purchase application was filed by her under S.80-B of the Act.
5. Sri M. V. Joseph, the counsel for the first respondent, would go to the extent of submitting that there is no express bar against a person claiming kudikidappu right with respect to the dwelling bouse which came into existence even after 1-1-1970. It is not, however, neces
