The right of cross-examination is not an invariable attribute of the requirement of reasonable opportunity under S.17(3) of the Act, and it depends on the terms of the Statute, the nature of the proceeding, the conduct of the party, and the circumstances of the case.

1. These revision cases raise the question whether the right of cross-examination is an essential ingredient of the 'reasonable opportunity' to be afforded to an assessee in order to prove the correctness and completeness of his return or before completing a best of judgment assessment under S.17(3) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act 19o3. The two tax revision cases by the same petitioner relate to different periods, T. R. C. No, 45 of 1975 to the assessment year 1965-66, and T. R. C. 46 of 1975 to the assessment year 1967-67. The Assessee-petitioner was a forest Coupe Contractor and was also running a rice mill. We are not concerned in these tax revision cases with the assessment of turnover derived as coupe contractor. The petitioner bad not filed any return for the years in question. His case before the Assessing Authority was that the mill was idle during the first half of the assessment year 1965-66. that thereafter the control of the mill had been given to one Pappachan as lessee, and that the petitioner had no turnover from the Mill for the years in question. The Assessing Authority issued a pre-assessment notice dated 22-4-1967 fixing the turnover at Rs, 1,10,400 at four times the bid amount, of the coupes, of which Rs. 33,500/- was to be taxed as turnover of timber and Rs. 22,000/- as turnover of firewood for the year 1965-66, and the balance left out of Rs. 1,10,400.00 was to be treated as the turnover for the year 1966-67. To this notice the Assessee replied with an objection dated 27-11-1967 that the turnover was excessive and the estimate should be only at two and a half times the bid amount Meanwhile, the Intelligence Officer, Ernakulam inspected the petitioner's rice mill on 24 519o7 and seized some records and also recorded a statement from Pappachan. These were sent over to the Assessing Officer. These disclosed that the Assessee was doing business in rice also. Pappachan, the alleged lessee denied the lease, and submitted that he was working only as an employee of the petitioner. The Assessing Officer therefore issued two revised pre-assessment notices dated 27 o19o8 estimating the turnover at Rs. 8,08,000.00 for 1965-66 and Rs. 8,28,210-50 for 1966-67. The petitioner filed objections which were overruled and the assessment was finalised as proposed in the notices An appeal against the order was dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and a further appeal to the Tribunal also proved unsuccessful.

2. Before the Sales-tax Officer, Alwaye, (Assessing Authority) as seen from the order, no contention was raised either that the petitioner was denied the right to cross examine Pappachan or that he was entitled to cross-examine him as part of his reasonable opportunity before the best of judgment assessment was completed under S.17 of the Act. On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it is seen from the order that the petitioner complained that the conclusion that Pappachan was an employee of the petitioner was a mere guess work, and that no opportunity was given to him to cross-examine Pappachan The Appellate Assistant Commissioner referred to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Jayantilal Thakordas v. State of Gujarat (1969 (23) S. T. C. 11) and held that any evidence which has some probative value could be used for the purpose of assessment and that the Sales-tax Officer was not bound by nice rules of evidence. On further appeal to the Tribunal, it was objected that the Assessing Officer was not justified in acting upon the seized records, without direct evidence connecting them with the appellant. There was a further objection that the statement of Pappachan recorded without giving notice to the appellant and without giving him an opportunity to cross-examine him, cannot be used against him. The Tribunal met this by stating that the appellant's definite case was that the Mill had been leased to Pappachan who was doing business therein, and when the alleged lease was denied by