The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are supplemental to those of the Rent Control Legislations, and a notice to quit under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary in addition to compliance with the requirement for eviction under the Rent Control Statutes.

1. The reference order reads:

"The question of law of general importance raised in this appeal relates to notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act What is required to be decided is whether a notice under S 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a necessary pre-requisite for eviction under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In view of the apparent conflict between the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v Vardesh Chander [(1976) 2 S.C.C. 103] on the one hand and Puwado Venkateswara Rao v. Chilamana Venketa Ramana (AIR. 1976 SC. 869) on the other hand considering the great importance of the question, we consider it desirable to have authoritative pronouncement on the question of law and for this purpose we adjourn the hearing and direct it to be placed before the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders for placing it before a Full Bench. We are told that CRP. No. 1707 of 1975 also raises the same question. This CRP. also may be posted along with it."

2. Sustaining the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge reversing the order of the Rent Control Court dismissing an application for eviction filed under sub-sections (2) and (4) (i) of S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the learned District Judge, on revision by the 2nd respondent before the Rent Control Court (and also before the learned Subordinate Judge) held that the landlord has made out a case of transfer by the tenant of his right under the lease evidenced by Ext. Al in favour of that 2nd respondent, though not one of subletting as held by the learned Subordinate Judge. On the question of notice to quit, differing from the learned Subordinate Judge according to whom proof of sending notice by registered post was sufficient to presume receipt thereof (there is such proof in this case) the learned District Judge held that there was a contract to the contrary as contemplated by S.106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in so far as Ext A-1 lease deed provides for surrender of possession of the building on demand, and that therefore, no notice to quit was required. This Civil Revision Petition is by the legal representatives of the tenant who was a co-respondent before the District Court and by the petitioner before that court, who, that court held to be a transferee from the tenant of his rights under Ext. A-1 lease. The correctness of this last mentioned finding is not canvassed before us. Eviction is opposed before us solely on the ground of want of quit notice. According to the learned counsel for the Civil Revision Petitioners, Ext. A-1 lease deed does not evidence a contract to the contrary as held by the learned District Judge. Therefore, it is submitted, without proper and sufficient notice determining the lease, neither the tenant nor his transferee can be evicted from the building in question. On these submissions two points alone arise for consideration, and they are:- (i) does Ext. A-1 lease deed contain a contract to the contrary as envisaged by S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; (ii) if it does not, is S.106 of the said Act attracted to statutory tenancies governed by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

3. Provision in the lease deed for surrender of possession of the leasehold without demur on demand made after the expiry of the term fixed is not according to the decisions of this court in Moothorakutty v. Ayissa Bi and others 1963 KLJ. 556 and Abdul Hameed Rawther v. Balakrishna Pillai 1968 KLT. 865 a contract to the contrary dispensing with quit notice. The correctness of these decisions is not canvassed before us, though it was brought to our notice that in Philip v. State Bank of Travancore 1972 KLT. 914 two of the learned judges on the Full Bench which decided that case expressed some doubt about the correctness of the principle laid down as above said. In that view the first point mentioned above has to be answered in the negative, and we do so.

4. Constru