The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for the Agricultural Tribunal to adhere to statutory provisions, consider the relationship of employer and workmen, and provide necessary relief in cases of denial of work.

1. We cannot sustain the judgment or the reasoning of the learned judge; and we think that this appeal should be allowed. The learned judge dismissed in limine the writ petition filed to quash Ext. P5 award of the Agricultural Tribunal, Palghat, passed under S.22 of the Kerala Agricultural Workers Act 1974. The dispute referred to the Tribunal by Ext. P1 order of reference, was regarding the denial of work employment to the three workmen concerned viz. (1) Aru (2) Janaki and (3) Rugmini. The reference had been preceded by attempts at conciliation and settlement, which failed and that had occasioned the reference to the Agricultural Tribunal for adjudication. The writ petitioner-appellant who was the land-owner filed Ex. P3 statement on 5-6-1976. In paragraph S therein, it was stated that the three workmen named in the reference were not his workmen and the question of providing work for them would not and could not arise. On the same day i. e. on 5-6-1976, a statement was filed by the Desiya Karshaka Thozhilali Federation, a Union on behalf of the workmen (Copy Ext. P4). The Tribunal thereafter passed Ext. P5 order dated 20th May, 1977 in which after a very cursory and unsatisfactory discussion, it concluded:

"In the above circumstances I rely upon the evidences adduced by the Union and I find that Aru, Kalyani and Rugmini are the permanent workers of Mathukutty."

We may straightaway notice that the finding recorded by the Tribunal had no relation to the issue referred for adjudication Nor has the Tribunal granted the necessary relief if its finding was that there was denial of work to the workmen. By necessary relief, we are envisaging either the relief of reinstatement or a direction to pay backwages with, or without compensation, or other such suitable relief. Whether the Tribunal had power to grant these reliefs or not, is a matter on which we need not, and do not, express our final opinion.

2. Counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant had a serious grievance against the way in which the Tribunal proceeded to pass Ext. P5 Award and to deal with the matter referred for adjudication. It was complained that the question whether the three named workmen were the workmen of the appellant or not, had neither been considered nor adjudicated upon, and that this basic question had to be dealt with by the Tribunal It was complained that the workmen in question were innocent of the statements which were foisted or thrust upon them at the instance of the Union, and which they themselves would not have shouldered on themselves. It was then complained that there was a serious illegality, or at least a severe irregularity, committed by the Tribunal is not having conformed to the statutory requirement of S 22(5) of the Act, which requires the Tribunal to hold its proceedings expeditiously, and as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the proceedings, not exceeding thirty days from the date of receipt of the reference by the Tribunal, to submit is Award to the District Collector. In this case, it was complained that although Ext. P1 order of reference was dated 17 51976, Ext. P5 Award was passed only on the 20th May 1977.

3. We think that the grievances ventilated by Counsel for the appellant are serious and substantial. The learned judge who dismissed the writ petition in limine observed that the finding was entered on issues of fact, and on consideration of the evidence, and that it was not for this Court to canvass such finding Regarding the complaint that no statement was filed by the workmen making a claim as required by law, the learned judge observed that this is contrary to what was said in the order of the Tribunal itself; and that if there were any such plea, the same should have been raised before the Tribunal in which case, it could have been dealt with by the Tribunal itself. In such circumstances, the learned judge refused to entertain the plea. In response to our enquiries as to the provision for representations