The court clarified that while the Limitation Act may not apply directly to appeals, the principle of S.14 of the Limitation Act, which excludes the time spent in bona fide prosecuting the litigation, can be applied to appeals.

1. These three revision petitions were adjourned by our learned brother Viswanatha Iyer, J. to be heard by a Division Bench. It was submitted before the learned judge that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (1973 KLT. 138) required reconsideration in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ashfaq. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P. (AIR. 1976 S.C. 2161). The learned judge felt that the question involved was fairly important.

2. The respondent in an application for eviction before the Rent Control Court under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, filed an appeal against the order to the appellate authority under the Act. Owing to the uncertainty in the identity of the forum where the appeal had to be presented, it flitted between the Sub Court, Parur, and District Court, Ernakulam, till it was eventually decided by this Court in O. P. Nos. 353, 363 and 364 of 1971 that the proper court for presentation of the appeal was the Sub Court, Ernakulam, and that in view of the delay that had intervened, the appeal had to be presented to that court with a petition to excuse the delay, under S.5 of the Limitation Act. This was done. Meanwhile, a Full Bench of this Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (1973 KLT. 138) had decided that the Limitation Act had application only to Courts. Following the principle of the said decision, it was ruled by the Sub Court that there was no power to excuse delay in filing the appeal. The

application to condone the delay was dismissed; consequently the appeal was also dismissed. A Revision was preferred to the District Court. That Court held that although the Limitation Act and the provisions of S.5 thereof cannot apply in view of the Full Bench decision in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (1973 KLT. 138), the principle of S.14 of the Limitation Act would apply and the time spent in bona fide prosecuting the litigation, during the period when the appeals flitted between the Sub Court and the District Court, was liable to be excluded. The applications to excuse delay were accordingly allowed, and the appeals were directed to be taken on file. The Revision Petitions are before us against the said order.

3. In the Full Bench judgment in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (1973 KLT.138), speaking for the majority (Viswanatha Iyer, J. dissenting), it was observed that the Limitation Act applied only to Courts and prescribed periods of limitations in respect of suits, appeals and applications filed only in Courts. For the said proposition, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, HubIi (AIR. 1969 SC. 1335) which ruled that the Limitation Act would apply only to proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and only in respect of proceedings taken in Courts. The principle that the Limitation Act would govern only to applications made to Courts was restated in Nityanand M. Joshi v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (AIR. 1970 SC. 209). Following these two decisions, the Full Bench had laid down the principle that the Limitation Act would apply only to proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure taken in courts.

4. What is now sought to be contended before us is that a different strand of reasoning was struck in a later ruling of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. K. (1976 KLT. 810). In view of the said decision it was stated that the earlier Full Bench decision requires re-examination. In 1976 KLT. 810 a petition under S.10 and 16 (5) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 read with S.51 of the Indian Electricity Act 1910 claiming compensation was filed before the District Judge, Tellicherry. Objection was raised that the petition was barred by time under Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. For the Electricity Board, it was answered that the said Article did not apply to applications to Di