The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Limitation Act does not apply to the adjudication conducted by the Assistant Registrar under S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act.

1. The short question that it raised in this case is whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable in the matter of adjudication of a claim preferred before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under S.60 of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1952 materially corresponding to S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. The Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum by its order Ext. P3 held that the provisions of the Limitation Act have no application to proceedings taken before the Registrar under S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (S. 60 of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act). O.P.No. 2879 of 1972 out of which this writ appeal arises was filed by the appellants herein challenging the correctness of the aforesaid view taken by the Co-operative Tribunal and praying that the order Ext. P3 should be quashed. Our learned brother Poti, J. dismissed the writ petition holding that the Tribunal was right in rejecting the plea of limitation on the ground that the Limitation Act had no application to the proceedings before the Registrar. Hence this appeal.

2. In Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others, AIR. 1969 SC. 1335, the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether an application filed before the Labour Court under S.33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. Following its earlier decisions in Sha Mulchand and Co. Ltd, v. Jawahar Mills Ltd, Salem, AIR. 1953 SC. 98, and The Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Others, AIR. 1964 SC. 752, the Supreme Court held that an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court not being Courts governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure the proceedings before them are not governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Ramarao and another v. Narayanan and another, AIR. 1969 SC. 724, the Supreme Court bad occasion to deal with the question whether the nominee of the Registrar appointed under S.95 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 is a 'Court' within the meaning of S.195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Answering the question in the negative it was held by the Supreme Court that even though the nominee of the Registrar is required to act judicially, i. e., fairly and impartially, the obligation to act judicially does not necessarily make him a 'Court' within the meaning of S.195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the view of the Supreme Court the Registrar's nominee is merely an arbitrator authorised within the limits of the power conferred to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him and is not entrusted with the judicial power of the State.

3. Strong reliance was placed by the appellants' counsel on certain observations contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another, AIR. 1967 SC. 1494. The question that arose in that case was whether an Assistant Registrar functioning under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act could be regarded as a Icourt' subordinate to High Court for purposes of S.3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It was held that the Assistant Registrar was functioning as a Court in deciding a dispute referred to him under S.48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act. It was further held that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 does not define 'contempt' or 'courts' and in the interests of justice any conduct amounting to contempt towards any person who can be called a'Court' should be amenable to the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It was however made clear by their Lordships that by that decision they did not intend to lay down that "all Registrars of all Co-operative Societies in the different States are 'Courts' for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952" and that the "decision is expressly limite