The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'preferred' in the context of filing an appeal within the prescribed time limit as required by the Kerala Education Rules.

1. The question which arises for decision in this writ appeal is whether an appeal preferred by the Manager, Aravukad High School, against Ext. P2 order, refusing to approve the appointment of the 3rd respondent in the writ petition, was preferred in time as required by Chapter XIV [A] R.8 sub-rule [6] of the Kerala Education Rules. The appeal was not entertained by the educational authorities on the ground that it was out of time. The learned judge in the writ-petition preferred jointly by the Manager and by an aggrieved teacher of the institution, took the view that the appeal had been preferred within time. He therefore allowed the writ petition and quashed Ext. P2 order and directed the authority concerned to deal with the appeal on the merits and to dispose of it in accordance with law. The 3rd respondent in the writ petition has filed this appeal.

(2) Chapter XIV[A] R.8 sub-rules [5] and [6] may conveniently be quoted:

[S] an appeal shall lie against the order declining approval of appointment issued by the Assistant Educational Officer or the District Educational Officer to the District Educational Officer or the Regional Deputy Director as the ease may be. The decision of the appellate authority shall be final.

[6] No appeal shall be entertained unless it is preferred within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against.

It is common ground that the last date for filing the appeal was 20-11-1974; that the appeal was despatched through post by the Manager on 19-11-19 4. and that for some reason it took a longer time than usual for transmission, and reached the Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction only on 21-11-1974, that is, one day beyond the last date for filing the appeal. The question, in the circumstances, is whether the appeal can be said to have been "preferred" within the time as required by the above rules. It will be noticed that sub-rule [6] contains an embargo against the entertainment of an appeal unless "preferred" within the 15 days contemplated by the Rules. What is the meaning of the expression "preferred" occurring in the Rule? The learned judge took the view, on an analysis of certain cases, that the expression would mean and comprehend a case of transmission by post of an appeal, sufficiently early, so as to reach its destination ordinarily and normally before the expiry of the period prescribed by the Rule; and if, for reasons, and under circumstances, not within the control of the party, it did not reach the destination is time and the party was not at fault, the appeal is not beyond time, but should be regarded as having been 'preferred" as contemplated by the Rule. The learned judge has relied on certain decisions relating to tender notifications in another branch of the law. With respect, we have spared ourselves the need to examine these decisions in detail. We feel, having regard to the scope and the object of the Rule, that the matter essentially depends upon the meaning to be attributed to the expression 'preferred'. The learned judge has himself noticed that one of the shades of meaning given to the expression was: 'received' or 'to lay a matter before any one formally for consideration, approval or sanction'; 'to bring forward, present, submit (a statement, bill, indictment, information, prayer, etc); or to place or set before any one for acceptance'. These being the well-understood meanings of the term, we are of the opinion that the principle of the decision noticed by the learned judge in Narian Ram Chandra Kalkar v. Union of India (1961 All. Q. 983) is more appropriate to the context and to the circumstances, than the other decisions which the learned judge has noticed, namely, Chathurbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of State for India (AIR. 1927 All. 215), Union of Indian. Asharfit Devi (AIR. 1957 M. P. 114), and Joseph Varghese v. Annamma (171 (1) Kerala 495). It appears to us, that we shall be treading on dangerous ground if we are to invoke the principle