The main legal point established in the judgment is that a female member of a Mithakshara family, particularly in the Cochin area, is entitled to claim a share of the family properties, and her presence is necessary for a proper adjudication of all the questions involved in a partition suit.

1. The revision petitioner is a female member of a Mithakshara joint family. Her complaint is that her application to get herself impleaded as an additional defendant in a suit for partition was rejected by the court below.

2. The 1st plaintiff and his sou the 2nd plaintiff filed a suit for partition of the properties left by the (deceased Krishna Iyer The 1st plaintiff is the only son of, Subramonia Iyer who is one of the two sons of Krishna Iyer, Subramonia Iyer is also dead. Admittedly the Ist plaintiff and his son the 2nd plaintiff are together entitled to one half of the properties' left by Krishna Iyer. The other half has admittedly devolved upon Narayana Iyer and his heirs. Narayana Iyer who is the Ist defendant, has two sons. They are Vasudevan who is the 2nd defendant, and Radhakrishnan who is the 3rd defendant, The revision petitioner is Narayana Iyer's wife, Ammini Ammal, and she wants to be made an additional defendant in the suit for the purpose of agitating her alleged rights as a co-sharer along with her sons and husband.

3. She was not made a party in the suit apparently because the plaintiffs believed that she had no right to claim a share of the family properties. It appears that she herself was unaware of her rights until an interim preliminary decree was passed. When she woke up to her rights upon the passing of the. interim preliminary decree, she moved the court to add her as a defendant

4. Counsel for the plaintiffs, Shri. T.S. Venkiteswara Iyer contends that a female member of a Mitakshara family has no right to claim a share of the family properties. He says that the statements of text book writers that a female member is entitled to a share of the properties of a Mithakshara family have no application to South India. Shri C.M. Divan; appearing for trie revision petitioner has drawn by attention to the relevant passages in Mulla's Hindu Law (14th Edn page 403) and Raghavacharia's Hindu Law (5th Edn. page 407). The learned authors express the view that a female member of a Mithakshara family is entitled to a share. Mulla says:

"A wife cannot herself demand a partition, but if a partition does take place between her husband and his sons, she is entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband."

The learned author however points out that in Southern India the practice of allotting shares upon partition to females has long since become obsolete, and relies upon the decision in Subramanian Chetti v. Arunachalam Chetti (1LR (1905) 28 Madras 1) This observation in relation to the position in Southern India was severely criticised by this Court in Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi 196S KLT. 141). Madhavan Nair, J speaking for the court observed that in so far as Travancore and Cochin were concerned the exception to the general principles stated by Mulla had no application. In other words, the women in these two areas of South India enjoyed similar rights as those in the northern parts of India Shri Venkiteswara Iyer however says that this is still a moot point for, according to him, the authorities are not unanimous in their views on the question. He says that the decision in 1965 KLT. 141 was dealing with a case of a Hindu widow and therefore the observations in that judgment cannot be taken as having concluded the point. He further points out that that decision was rendered in respect of a Travancore family and not a Cochin family According to counsel, a female member of a South Indian Mithakshara family, particularly in the Cochin area, has no right to claim a share of the family properties. Be that as it may, this is a question which has to be examined and for that the petitioner is entitled to an opportunity.

5. Counsel for the plaintiffs, supported by counsel appearing for defendants 2 and 3 who are the revision petitioner's only sons, however contends that the revision petitioner cannot be added as a party after the passing of a