The court emphasized that an executive action, such as an annual payment sanctioned by the Ruler, does not necessarily create a legal right enforceable in court, and the state's liability and obligation must be established under relevant legal provisions.

1. The former Ruler, Maharaja of Travancore, sanctioned an annual payment of Rs. 75,000/- from 611 1931 to the petitioner who ruled that State as Regent from 191924 to 6111931. Admittedly payments were made in equal monthly instalments till 26 2 -1972; thereafter payments were stopped. This is a motion for mandamus to enforce continued payments.

2. By Ext. P5 letter the Chief Secretary of Travancore State informed the Accounts Officer of that State about the said sanction; Art.523 of the Travancore Financial and Account Code, Vol. I, Chapter XIV (Ext. P6) also evidences the sanction of the said sum and its allotment; Ext. P9 is the copy of the letter whereby petitioner was informed of the sanctioning of the said sum as an'allowance'; in Ext. P7 receipt petitioner refers to the amount as pension; in Exts. P11 to P13 letters the Comptroller of Travancore-Cochin also refers to the payments as pension; Exts. P12 and P13 show that the payments were debited under the head: '54 (A) Territorial and Political Pensions'.

3. It was argued that it was the 'duty and obligation of the Ruler of Travancore State' to pay this amount to the petitioner, and that this duty and obligation devolved on Travancore-Cochin State under Art.3 (b) of the Covenant between the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin States, and thereafter on the Kerala State. Art.3 (b) reads:

"As from the appointed day,

(a) xxxxxx

(b) '11 duties and obligations of the Ruler of either of the Covenanting States pertaining or incidental to the Government of that State shall devolve on the United State, and shall be discharged by it; and

(c) xxxX

According to the learned Advocate-General, if at all, only Art.16 of the Covenant would be attracted. It is disputed that even that article would be of any assistance to the petitioner. Art.16 reads: -

"The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947 "

'Disputes arising out of a provision of a Covenant' are outside the pale of this Court's jurisdiction. This is so under the first part of Art.363 of the Constitution. A dispute relating to interpretation of any of the provisions as also as regards enforcement of any provision of the Covenant, is certainly a'dispute arising out of the provisions of the Covenant'. I am supported in this view by the Supreme Court decision in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India (AIR. 1971 S.C.:30). See Para.66,142, 227, 310 and 352. Therefore, the submission based on Art.3 (b) of the Covenant cannot be countenanced.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the Travancore-Cochin State recognised and accepted this obligation to pay the amount to the petitioner by S.7(b) of the Travancore-Cochin Administration and Application of Laws Act, 1125, and that this obligation devolved on the Kerala State on its formation.

5. The Travancore-Cochin State came into existence on 1-7-1949 by the union of Travancore and Cochin States. On that very day the Administration and Application of Laws Ordinance, 1124, was promulgated. It was thereafter followed by the Administration and Application of Laws Act, 1125. The object of the Ordinance as also of the Act was to provide for the continuance, in the respective areas of the two erstwhile constituent States of the existing laws, that is, the laws that were in force in those States immediately prior to 17 1949. It was something like a re-enactment by the new State of these enactments which had ceased to be in force on the formation of the new State, whole of them at once, confining the territorial extent of their operation to the respective areas. S.7 of the Ordinance and the Act read alike and is analogous to S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, but with this difference, viz., S.7 deals with the effect or the formation of the new State instead of t