The status of kudikidappukaran and the right to purchase kudikidappu under the Land Reforms Act can be affected by subsequent disqualifications, and the rights and liabilities under the Act are subject to subsequent events and developments.

1. Petitioner instituted an application under S.80B, Land Reforms Act (called hereunder the Act for convenience) for purchase of kudikidappu to which be was then entitled. While his application was pending before the Land Tribunal, be and his wife together purchased on 18 111974, 85 cents of garden land fit enough to erect a homestead. The respondent-landowner thereupon contended that with the acquisition of this land the petitioner had ceased to be a kudikidappukaran and had thereby lost his right to purchase the kudikidappu. This defence was rejected by the Tribunal but prevailed with the Appellate Authority which reversed the order of the Tribunal and dismissed the application. The petitioner challenges the appellate decision.

2. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. Achan contended that the decisive date is 111970 when S.80A which entitled kudikidappukaran to purchase his kudikidappu and S.80B which prescribed the procedure for that purpose, came into force and as the petitioner was a kudikidappukaran at that date, the subsequent acquisition of land by him cannot disqualify him or entail dismissal of his application. It was also contended that the normal rule is 'Once a kudikidappukaran, always a kudikidappukaran' subject to his being evicted under S.75 (1) or to his kudikidappu being shifted under S.75 (2). Counsel argued that the acquisition of land in the present case might entitle the respondent-landowner to evict him by virtue of S.75 (1) (iv) but would not by itself destroy his status as a kudikidappukaran or preclude him from sustaining his application and obtaining an order of purchase.

3. I find myself unable to accept this contention. S.2(25) defines 'kudikidappukaran' and on its terms, the definition excludes from its scope a person who possesses land exceeding the prescribed limit of three, five or ten cents depending upon its location, either as owner or as tenant on which he could erect a homestead. There is no controversy that with the purchase of the land on 18 111974, the petitioner would be outside the definition but what is urged is that as the rights and liabilities had become crystallized on 1 11970, this subsequent acquisition is of no moment as it cannot destroy his character as a kudikidappukaran. It is true that S.80A and 80B came into force on 111970 and that at that date the petitioner was a kudikidappukaran. But in order to sustain an application under S.80B and obtain an order of purchase he has to fill the character of kudikidappukaran; for it is only the issue of a certificate of purchase under S.80C (2) that vests the landowner's right, title and interest in him. The Act prescribes no prohibition against the creation of future kudikidappus (as in the case of leases vide S.73) nor again does it prescribe a time limit within which an application for purchase of kudikidappu (even an existing kudikidappu) has to be made (as it does in the case of tenants under S.72B (3)). The result is that if the other element are satisfied, a kudikidappu can come into existence even after 111970 and again by losing his qualifications at any time after the date, a kudikidappukaran will lose bis character as such until of course he becomes cemented as an owner with the issue of the certificate of purchase. There is no warrant in the provisions of the Act, which justifies the inference that irrespective of whatever disqualification he incurs, a person who was a kudikidappukaran on 1 11970 continues to be so. The petitioner's position after 18 111974 was that he ceased or disqualified to be a kudikidappukaran and thereby becomes disentitled to an order of purchase. That this event has occurred in the course of the proceeding before the Tribunal is immaterial, as even an appellate or revisional court can take note of supervening events to mould reliefs. That position has been well settled at least from the time of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, AIR. 1941 F.C. 5, which has been followed in o