The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for a judicial approach by the Land Tribunal, the need to establish the bonafide need for the site of the kudikidappu, and the inequity of not fixing a time limit for the transfer of the alternate site.

1. Several interesting questions are raised by the appellant in this writ appeal who was the petitioner before the learned single Judge. In the Original Petition he challenged an order of the Land Tribunal, Alangad on an application under S.77 read with S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The applicant before the Land Tribunal sought the shifting of the kudikidappu of the respondent therein for the purpose of developing an industry which was run by him, that being one of making bricks. The kudikidappukaran who was the respondent in that application contended that the requirement of the applicant was not bonafide, that even in the property in which the kudikidappu was situate there was sufficient area for the Choola intended to be erected by the applicant without disturbing the kudikidappukaran, that the alternate site was not suitable for erecting a homestead and further that the application itself was not maintainable since the notice contemplated under S.77 of the Act was not preceded by a requisition for shifting. The Land Tribunal inspected the site on 13 51972 and found that the applicant was conducting brick business, that the Choola for baking bricks was situate very near the but where the kudikidappukaran was residing and that shifting of the kudikidappu was necessary for development of the industry. On the question whether B schedule property was suitable for erecting a homestead the decision was similarly based on the local inspection made by the Tribunal. The application was allowed and the applicant was directed to transfer ownership of the alternate site offered without fixing a time limit for such transfer. But the respondent was asked to shift his kudikidappu to the new site within two months from the date of the Tribunal's order. The learned single judge while agreeing with the Land Tribunal found that the petitioner need shift to the new site only within two months after the respondent transferred the new site to the petitioner in the Original Petition and deposited the amount of Rs. 750/-towards shifting charges.

2. The contentions raised before us may be enumerated:

1. The petition for shifting was not maintainable in law since there was no requisition preceding the statutory notice under S.77.

2. The findings of bonafide requirement as well as suitability of the alternate site were based solely on the results of local inspection by the Land Tribunal and this was not proper. Consequently the order of the Tribunal should have been quashed.

3. The question of bonafide requirement has not been properly approached. The contention of the appellant, all along, was that there was no necessity for shifting the kudikidappu even for developing the brick business and the appellant's case is that the approach to the question by the Land Tribunal was wrong in the light of the decisions of this Court.

4. The direction for transfer of B schedule property without fixing a time limit therefor was quite inequitable as it will operate harshly upon the appellant-kudikidappukaran.

3. It is true that the kudikidappukaran has to be requested to shift from his kudikidappu and it is only on non-compliance with such requisition that the question of issue of statutory notice would arise. There is no case in the objection by the kudikidappukaran that no such requisition was made. All the same it was argued that the absence of mention of such requisition having been made in the statutory notice issued under S.77 of the Act would be fatal. We fail to appreciate this plea, for, there is no requirement that there should be mention in the statutory notice of a requisition having been made and that having not been complied with. We feel that there is no substance in this contention raised by the appellant.

4. Time and again this court had occasion to point out that local inspections by officers who are to decide causes are not for the purpose of collecting evidence. Judicial and quasi-