The main legal point established in the judgment is that economic backwardness plays a significant role in determining social and educational backwardness, and the fixation of an income ceiling is a valid criterion for determining social and educational backwardness.

1. The appeals arise from a common judgment disposing of O. P. Nos. 4873, 5006, 5004, 5188 and 5449 of 1974. The Original Petitions raise the same question that has been dealt with in the judgment which gave rise to the appeals.

2. The points raised in arguments advanced in the Writ Appeals and the Original Petitions by counsel were also common. We shall therefore dispose of the Writ Appeals and the Original Petitions by this common judgment.

3. The facts of the Original Petitions disposed of by the common judgment which is under appeal in the Writ Appeals have been stated in Para.1 to 6 of the judgment. We shall extract those paragraphs:

"The petitioners in these Original Petitions applied for admission to the first M.B.B.S. course for the year 1974-75. But they did not get admission. The petitioners who belong to communities which are socially and educationally backward, question the constitutionality of the restriction imposed in G. O P. 208/66/Edn. dated 2-5-1966 (Ext. P-1 in. O. P. No. 4873 of 1974) which insists that only applicants who are members of families whose aggregate annual income is below Rs. 6000/- will be entitled to admission to the seats reserved for students belonging to the backward classes. The petitioners have got alternate contention that in any case, the income ceiling of Rs. 6000/- fixed in Ext. P1 G. O. is highly arbitrary and hence not valid and sustainable.

2. The petitioner in O.P. No. 4873 of 1974 belongs to the Muslim community. She secured 349 marks and is entitled to 5 marks more on the basis of her sport certificate. Though she secured more marks than the minimum fined this year for candidates of the Muslim community, she was not selected for admission to the first M.B.B S. course. Her father is a small businessman. She did not produce an income certificate of the Tahsildar because her father was having income which is a little more than Rs.6000/-. the ceiling fixed in Ext. P-1 G.O. Along with the petitioner's application Exts P-3 and P-4 income-tax assessment orders issued to the petitioner's father for the years 1972-73 and 1973-74 respectively were submitted. As per Ext. P-3 the net income is Rs.3710/- and as per Ext. P-4 the net income is Rs.7020/-. As the petitioner's name was not included in the list of selected candidates, she on 5-11-1974 submitted Ext. P-5 application before the 2nd respondent-State. No orders are so far issued on Ext. P-5 and the enquiries made by the petitioner's father revealed that there is no prospect of Ext P-5 application being allowed in view of Ext. P-1 and the other orders in the matter. It is under the above circumstances that the petitioner has approached this Court with this Original Petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the ceiling of income limit in Ext. P-1 and other subsequent orders in the matter and for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order to treat the petitioner as a member of socially and educationally backward class and to consider the petitioner for admission to the Medical College in the State and to admit the petitioner for the first M.B.B.S. course. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 1st respondent-Principal, Medical College, Trivandrum. The statement in the above counter-affidavit is that candidates from families whose annual income is less than Rs.6000/- are only eligible to be considered for admission under reservation. The petitioner has not produced the income certificate and hence she was not considered under reservation. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit. The statement in the reply affidavit is that the direction in Ext. P-1 G.O. is that applicants should produce only a community certificate and there is no mention about the production of an income- cenificate. It is also pointed out in the reply affidavit that nothing is mentioned therein about the contentions raised by the petitioner in the Original Petition.

3. The petitioner in O.P No. 5006 of 1974 is also a me