The main legal point established is the distinction between 'inquiry' and 'trial' in the context of warrant cases and summons cases, and the specific procedural requirements for each type of case.

1. This is an appeal filed by the State against acquittal of the respondent who was the accused in a private complaint C. C. No. 232 of 1973, instituted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Manjeri, by the Drugs Inspector, Malappuram, alleging commission of offences punishable under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Clause.15 (2) and 17 of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1970. The respondent was acquitted under S.247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, hereinafter called the Old Code, on the ground that the complainant was absent on July 15,1974, the date on which the case was posted for bearing.

2. The learned State Prosecutor submitted that the order of acquittal is clearly illegal, as S.247 of the Old Code has absolutely no application to the facts of this case which is a warrant case governed by the provisions relating to warrant cases.

3. The Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1970 was said to have been passed in exercise of the powers conferred under S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The accusations against the respondent in the complaint are that, on the various dates mentioned therein, he, the proprietor of Rema Drugs House, Manjeri sold certain types of medicines for prices higher than the prescribed fates and that there was no price list of medicines exhibited or displayed at his place of business. These allegations, prima facie disclose offences punishable under sub-section 1 (a) (ii) of S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act. This aspect was not disputed before me. The offences alleged to have been committed by the respondent are therefore punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also fine. This is therefore a warrant case and not a summons case as misconceived by the court below.

4. The complaint in this case was filed on 14 111973 and the trial of the case was to be governed by the provisions of the Old Code, and the procedure to be followed in the trial was the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases. The acquittal of the respondent under S.247 of the Old Code, as if this was a summons case, is therefore wrong and illegal The ground on which the acquittal was ordered was the absence of the complainant on the date on which the case was posted for hearing. No charge had been framed against the respondent; the trial had not yet been started and it was at the stage of inquiry. Therefore there is no question of acquittal arising in the case at this stage. Being a warrant case, the only section under which the accused can be discharged for the absence of the complainant is S.259 of the Old Code. (S. 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter called the New Code.) This section expressly states that the powers thereunder can be exercised only in cases of offences, which may be lawfully compounded or are noncognizable. It is not disputed that the offences alleged against the respondent are neither compoundable nor noncognizable. Therefore S.259 of the Old Code has no application to the case. This apart the records available in the case disclose that, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, that this is a summons case, the mandatory provisions of S.242 of the Old Code (S. 251 of the New Code) have been violated. In either case, the order, whether it is in effect one of discharge or not, is clearly illegal and is liable to be set aside.

5. The learned State Prosecutor submitted that, as the learned Magistrate purported to acquit the accused, this can be treated as an appeal. Even if S.417 of the Old Code is not in terms attracted, the matter having been brought to the notice, this Court has power to interfere with the order impugned in exercise of its revisional powers. An appeal, in a proper case, can be treated as a revision (see The State v. Balaprasad, ILR.1954 Nag. 757). A question of interest, when does a trial commence, arises in this regard. The trial of an accused person commences when he is called upon to plead to