The central legal point established in the judgment is the determination of the nature of the agreement (Ext. P1) as a license, not a lease, based on the intention of the parties and the rights and obligations conferred by the agreement.

1. This appeal by the second defendant arises out of a suit for recovery of the site of a shed, with rent, past and future and certain other reliefs.

2. The shed which bears Municipal No. 306/XXX, stands in a 23 cent plot in Trichur town. There is a building (called hereunder as the Guest House) in this land and it had been rented by the Sitaram Mills for the residence of its Engineer E. S. Mehta. Mehta was conducting a bobbin factory called Mehta Kavina and Co. in a plot on the north belonging to another tavazhi of the plaintiff's tarwad. For the purpose of this factory Mehta was permitted, by the plaintiff's father Kuttan Nair, to erect a shed in the suit property, on a monthly' ground rent of Rs. 2.50. Later he was allowed to demolish a portion of the northern compound wall and a portion of the eastern compound wall, on the understanding that he would reconstruct the demolished portions, when he vacated the building. Mehta left the services of the Sitaram Mills and returned to his native place Ahamedabad. The first defendant who is his brother-in-law agreed to remove the shed and restore the compound walls and he also took the Guest House on rent in 1954. The plaintiff has taken other proceedings for eviction in respect of the building. This suit was brought for removal of the shed, recovery of rent and restoration of the compound walls. That in brief is the plaintiff's case. The second defendant was impleaded on the allegation that he was now known to be the proprietor of Mehta Kavina and Co.

3. The second defendant alone contested the suit. He said that it was Metha and not the Sitaram Mills that took the Guest House on rent, that he also took on lease an area of 70' x 30' at the northern portion of the suit property on a rent of Rs. 2.50 and that besides erecting the shed he also improved the property by planting trees. On resigning his job at the Sitaram Mills, Mehta assigned his business and leaseholds to the appellant. The appellant is thus in possession of the building, bobbin factory and the compound. The first defendant, his father, has nothing to do with this arrangement. The appellant also denied the other reliefs claimed in the plaint contending that even if the arrangement was a licence it was one coupled with interest and was therefore irrevocable.

4. Ext. P1 is the letter dated 10 51944 (Ext. D13 is its copy) passed by Kuttan Nair, to Mehta and accepted by the latter and it contains the terms of the agreement between them in regard to the suit site. The trial court construed this to be a licence and not a lease and in that view rejected the appellant's claim to the benefits of S.106 of Act I of 1964. It also rejected his plea that licence was one coupled with an interest. It however held that so long as the appellant was in occupation of the Guest House, he was not bound to vacate the shed or restore the compound walls. On these findings the plaintiff was given only a decree for arrears of rent for 3 years and future rent till date of decree. The other reliefs were refused.

5. The second defendant appealed from this decree and the plaintiff filed a memorandum of cross-objections. The appellate court confirmed the finding that Ext. P1 was only a licence and that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of S.60(b), Easements Act. About the termination of the licence, it reversed the trial court, holding that the license had long been terminated or relinquished by Mehta permanently leaving for Ahamedabad and that the occupation of the Guest House by the second defendant would not confer on him the benefit of retaining the licence granted to Mehta. It however found that the second defendant was not liable to restore the compound wall demolished by Mehta. The plaintiff was thus given a decree for recovery of the site after removal of the shed with future rent also.

6. The principal question in the appeal is whether Ext. P1 evidences only a licence as held by the courts below or whether it amounts to a