The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of complying with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act for the proper termination of tenancy, emphasizing the requirement for a valid notice to quit and the importance of the date of commencement of tenancy.

1. Sri P. M. Balasubramoniam, the learned counsel for the appellant in the second appeal filed by the defendant, has stressed in bis argument mainly one point; and that relates to a question of law pertaining to quit notice under S.106 of the Transfer of property Act. The relevant portion of S.106 of the T. P. Act reads as follows:

"and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to baa lease from month to a month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.

2. The plaintiff's case, briefly stated, is as follows: One Pokken, father of the plaintiff, was the owner of the property in which the plaint schedule shop building is situate. Under the said Pokken one Kumaran, brother of the defendant, was a lessee, the date of lease being 131952 and the rate of rent being Rs. 6/-per month. There is no written agreement with respect to the lease. After the death of Pokken, the defendant bad attorned to the plaintiff's brother, and later to the plaintiff, when the property in question was allotted to her in partition. On 29 10 1968 the plaintiff issued Ext. A-3 notice to the defendant demanding surrender of the plaint schedule building with arrears of rent by 30 111968. To quote the actual words used.

3. The question is whether in and by Ext. A-3 notice there has been a proper and valid termination of the defendant's tenancy.

4. pw.1 is the husband of the plaintiff. He has admitted in the witness box that he bad no direct knowledge about the date on which the tenancy commenced though in the plaint it has been stated that the lease in favour of Kumaran was on 131952. The allegation in the plaint, according to pw.1, was based on information furnished by the defendant. However, unfortunately for the plaintiff, the defendant neither in his written statement nor in his evidence as dw.1 supported this assertion of pw.1; all that the defendant could remember ' was that he got possession of the building from his brother Kumaran on 12 21952. According to him, his brother had tenancy right even as early as 12 21951. There is evidence in this case that even prior to 131952 either Kumaran or the defendant was in possession of the building. The plaintiff has not alleged or proved that this tenancy started prior to 131952 has been terminated and a new tenancy has been commenced between the parties on and from 131952. No reliable material has been placed before the Court to take the view that the tenancy in question started on 131952 as alleged in the plaint. In other words, the tenancy of the date 131952 set up by the plaintiff has not been proved.

5. Reliance is placed by Sri P. P. Anathanarayana Iyer, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the recitals in Exts. B-7 and B-10 for drawing an inference that the tenancy must have commenced on the 1st of March 1952 as alleged in the plaint, not on 12 21951 or 12 21952 as contended by the defendant. Est. B-7 is a receipt evidencing payment of rent of Rs. 36/-for six months from 1111966 to 30 41967 at the rate of Rs. 6/-per month. Ext. B-10 is a receipt for payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 6/- per month for six months from 1111967 to 30 41968. All that these receipts can establish is that the rent was at the rate of Rs. 6/- per month and that during the relevant period rent was paid on a monthly basis commencing from the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. This does not, however, throw any light on the date of commencement of the tenancy which is the most relevant factor while considering the validity and sufficiency of Ext. A-3 notice.

6. Sri. Anathanarayana Iyer has also placed reliance on the decision reported in Venkatagopal v. Rangappa (ILR. VII Madras 365) where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held as follows:

"Payment of rent in a particular form at a certain rate for a number of years is not only presumptive evidence of the existence of a contrac