The right to form associations does not guarantee recognition by the employer.

1. The appellant is the Vice President of the Kerala State Electricity Board Executive Workers' Union. He filed a writ petition on behalf of the Union for quashing Ex. P9, claiming that the respondent, the Kerala State Electricity Board, should not have withdrawn the recognition given by the Board to the Union. A learned judge dismissed the writ petition, and hence the appeal. The decision of the Single Judge is reported as M. A. David v The Kerala State Electricity Board (1972 I. L. L. J. 44).

2. Some of the contentions raised before the Single Judge have not been very seriously urged before us: of course, they have also been urged, but not seriously. One of them is that the decisions taken under Ex. P9 were under extraneous political pressure. As the Single Judge has rightly pointed out, the allegations of mala fides are denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Board. And it is also averred in the counter affidavit that the Board has taken these decisions bona fide after careful deliberation without being influenced by any extraneous consideration. The Single Judge has accepted the truthfulness and genuineness of these allegations; and we do not think we need reconsider the matter at the appellate stage.

3. The next contention urged is that, though the Board has stated that Ex. P9 has been passed on the principle of recognition of only majority unions this principle has not been strictly adhered to by the Board in giving recognition to some other unions which are not strictly majority unions. In support of this the counsel has pointed out that the union of drivers by name the Kerala State Electricity Board Drivers' Union has been recognised in Ex. P9 though it is not a majority union. Here also the averments in the counter affidavit indicate that the drivers form a separate category distinct from the other executive employees and the Drivers' Union represents the majority of the drivers. Thus, on this contention also we agree with the Single Judge.

4. The next contention urged is a more serious one, viz., that the withdrawal of recognition of the Union represented by the appellant infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) of the Constitution. Though this contention has been raised by the counsel, the counsel has not seriously pursued it in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by the Single Judge himself, viz., All India Bank Employees' Association v. The National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay (AIR. 1962 S.C.171) and M/s. Raghubar Dayal Jai Parakash v. The Union of India (AIR. 1962 S.C. 263). In addition to these two decisions referred to by the Single Judge, another, recent decision of the Supreme Court has also come to our notice, viz., D.A.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1971 S.C.1737), where the Supreme Court has referred to the earlier decisions and has confirmed them: the principle laid down is that the right guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) to form associations does not carry with it the concomitant right that the associations shall achieve their object: in other words, the right to form associations does not have with it the concomitant right that such associations should be recognised by the employer. Thus, this contention is also not of any avail.

4. The contention seriously urged by the counsel of the appellant is that, recognition having been accorded once the same should not have been withdrawn without notice to the Union: in other words, the principle of natural justice, viz., audi alteram partem has been violated in withdrawing the recognition already granted to the Union.

5. It is not disputed by the Board that recognition was granted to this Union in 1966. But, the contention of the Board is that the Union was not entitled to recognition and the mere fact that the Board recognised the Union does not confer on it any right which the Union otherwise does not have. It is also contended by the Board that Ex. P9 contains a dec