1972 Supreme(Ker) 203
Judges : K.BHASKARAN
DAMODARA MENON - Appellant
Versus
VARIATH AND ANOTHER - Respondent
Case No : C. R. P. No. 237 of 1970
Decided On : 10/27/1972
Advocates Appeared :
P. K. Kesavan Nair; R. Damodharan Namboodiripad; M. Ramakrishnan; For Petitioners M. Abraham; For Respondents
The main legal point established in the judgment is that a lessee inducted into possession of the property by a person having life interest alone is entitled to apply for fair rent fixation as per S.31 of the Land Reforms Act.
Headnote:
Land Reforms Act - Fair Rent Fixation - S.3(1)(vi), S.31 - The court discussed the applicability of fair rent fixation for a lessee inducted into possession of the property by a person having life interest alone. The court interpreted the provisions of S.3(1)(vi) and its amendment by Act 35 of 1969, and concluded that the lessee was entitled to apply for fair rent fixation as per S.31 of the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved the question of whether a lessee inducted into possession of the property by a person having life interest alone is entitled to apply for fixation of fair rent.
Finding of the Court:
The Appellate Authority reversed the finding of the Land Tribunal and held that the lessee was entitled to apply for fair rent fixation. The court dismissed the revision without costs.
Issues: The main issue was the entitlement of a lessee to apply for fair rent fixation in a case where the landlord had only a limited interest in the property.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the provisions of S.3(1)(vi) and its amendment by Act 35 of 1969, and concluded that the lessee was entitled to apply for fair rent fixation as per S.31 of the Act.
Final Decision: The court found no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Appellate Authority and dismissed the revision without costs.
1. A short, but rather interesting and important, question arises for decision in this revision filed under S.103 of the Land Reforms Act. The question is whether a lessee inducted into possession of the property by a person having life interest alone is entitled to apply for fixation of fair rent in respect of the holding.
2. The Land Tribunal without going into the merit of the case and without recording a finding on the pleadings relating to the genuineness of the lease set up by the respondents herein (the petitioner and the legal representative of the 3rd respondent before the Land Tribunal), held that inasmuch as the party arrayed as the landlord had only a limited interest, the question of fixation of fair rent did not arise. The
Land Tribunal, for its conclusion, placed reliance on cl. (vi) of sub-s. (1) of S.3 of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, which reads as follows:
"3. Exemptions. (I) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to
(vi) tenancies in respect of land or of buildings or of both created by persons having only life interest or other limited interest in the land or in the buildings or in both:"
The Appellate Authority, however, reversed the finding of the Land Tribunal with respect to the maintainability of the petition and remanded the matter for considering the other questions relevant for the purpose of fixation of fair rent. The Appellate Authority took the view that the family karar Ext. R-1 under which the 1st respondent before the Land Tribunal obtained the property for her maintenance specifically provides for the enjoyment of the property in any form, including by leasing out the same.
3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that this view taken by the Appellate Authority is unwarranted by the provisions contained in cl. (vi) of sub-s. (1) of S.3 of the Act. According to him, it is immaterial whether or not the lease by the person having life interest is with the consent of other persons interested in the property. His argument is that if the lease is by a person who is having only a life interest, the exemption provision contained in S.3 comes into operation, and the petitioner before the Land Tribunal is precluded from applying for fixation of fair rent, as nothing contained in Chapter II which deals with fixation of fair rent is applicable to tenancies created by a person having only life interest or limited interest in the property leased.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that in a case like this, where there is limited interest or life interest coupled with a specific right to lease out the property, the position is different and it cannot be considered to be a case of lease by a person having life interest simpliciter The learned counsel goes to the extent of saying that the right to grant lease in respect of the property conferred on the maintenance allottee, in the instant case, is in the nature of a right in that behalf derived under a power of attorney given to her on behalf of the other persons interested in the property. Cl. (vi) of sub-s. (1) of S, 3, according to the learned counsel, relates only to a case where the document, under which the maintenance allottee derives right, does not confer special right to the allottee to lease out the property. It is also pointed out that Ext. R-1 not only confers right to lease out the property but also does not indicate the maximum period for or up to which the lease could operate. I think there is considerable force in this contention. However, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of this position inasmuch as this revision could be disposed of on other grounds with which I am dealing presently.
5. Cl. (vi) of sub-s. (1) of S.3 of the parent Act has been amended by Act 35 of 1969 substituting the proviso thereto in order to make the provisions of Chapter II applicable to tenancies falling under cls. (v) and (vi) of the subsection, except for the purpose of S.53 to 72S of the Act,