The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the exemption clause in S.3(1)(i) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, and the determination of whether the State Bank of Travancore was a Corporation owned or controlled by the State.

1. This appeal is by the 3rd defendant in a suit for eviction and recovery of possession on the basis of Ex. P3 lease dated 27-7-1956 granted to the 1st defendant in the suit for a term of one year on a rent of Rs. 480/-. The lessor was the Travancore Forward Bank which, consequent on the amalgamation of Banks, was taken over in or about 1960 by the State Bank of Travancore, which instituted the suit. The appellant and the 2nd defendant had a contention that Ex. P3 lease was benami for their benefit, but this was found against by the trial court and was not repeated before us. The appellants claimed to be entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 of the Kerala Act 1 of 1964. But this was found against, by reason of the exemption contained in S.3(1)(i) of the Act. Their further contention that the suit was bad for want of a proper notice to quit, was also found against on the ground that there was a contract to the contrary which was

sufficient to dispense with the statutory requirement of a notice. These two contentions alone have been pressed before us.

2. First, as to the question of notice. Ex. P3 is for a term of one year which expired on 27-7-1957. The suit was filed on 9-10-1965. There was no assent by acceptance of rent, to the continuance in possession of the defendants since the expiry of the tenancy and prior to the institution of the suit. But they continued in possession. The plaint treated the 1st defendant as tenant and defendants 2 and 3 as sub tenants, and claimed arrears of rent for three years prior to the suit at the rate stipulated in Ex. P1 and future 'rent at the rate of Rs. 500/-. Both were decreed by the court below only at Rs. 480/- per year. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff had "otherwise assented" to the continuance in possession of the defendants as tenants within the meaning of S.116 of the Transfer of Property Act and that there was a tenancy by holding over subsequent to the expiry of the period of Ex. P3. As a result, the lease Ex. P3 would stand statutorily renewed from year to year. Ex. P3 contained two terms which we may notice. One was that on the expiry of the term, the 1st defendant would surrender possession of the property whenever demanded without any opposition or contest; and the other, that if the lessee defaulted payment of rent for two consecutive months, or damaged the building or the trees in the property, then, without any regard to the term, the lessee shall be liable to surrender possession and the lessor shall have the right to evict. For the respondent-landlord it was contended that both these terms in Ex. P1 would be statutorily incorporated in the tenancy by holding over and that either of them would be a sufficient contract to the contrary to exclude the statutory notice, required by S.106, of the Transfer of Property Act. That the first of these provisions would not have such effect, was ruled by one of us, (the Chief Justice) sitting alone in Moothorakutty v. Ayissa Bi & Others (1963 KLJ. 556) following the principle of the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Kodali Bapayya and others v. Yadavalli Venkatarama and Others (AIR. 1953 Mad. 884). The view was approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Hameed Rawther v. Balakrishna Pillai (1968 KLT. 865). We think it unnecessary, for the purpose of this case to express a final and concluded opinion as to whether a clause to surrender on demand without contest and without opposition, would be a contract to the contrary, so as to exclude the statutory notice required by S.106. Two of us, (myself and Viswanatha Iyer J) share some doubt as to whether the decision in Kodali Bapayya"s case (AIR. 1953 Mad. 884) is not in direct conflict with the two prior Division Bench rulings referred to therein and sought to be distinguished, namely Eranhikal Talappil Moosa Kutty v. Kozhikote Puthia Kovilakath Thekke (AIR. 1928 Mad. 687) and Kelu v. AmmaluKutti (1910 M. W. N. 79