The court emphasized the importance of restoring conjugal harmony and the need for careful consideration of irreconcilable breach as a ground for divorce under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act.

1. The matrimonial misfortune, of a Muslim couple, Mammu Koya and Mariyambi, has forced its way into court from both ends, each spouse institu-ting a lawsuit, the husband soliciting the wife's society in an action for restitu-tion of conjugal rights and the wife demanding a divorce snapping the ties between the two as intolerable to continue. The tragic feature of this marital estrangement is that a child born to the couple has to share the mishap by being denied the healthy environs of a happy parental home.

2. The parties are relatively young although the profile of their conjugal life bears scars and wounds which form the subject-matter of the two suits. According to the husband, (who is the plaintiff in O. S. No. 213 of 1962, which has given rise to S. A. No. 281 of 1970) his wife (the 2nd defendant in the suit, her father being the 1st defendant) was living with him in comparative quiet and a son was born to them. The lady left for her father's house with the child some two years before the suit and did not return. The husband was not allowed access to his father-in-law's house and thus, without reason, the wife has withdrawn her consortium thanks to the wrongful obstruction of her father. The plaintiff's further version is that he had been sending sums of money for the maintenance of his wife, but they were being refused at the instance of the 1st defendant. So, he seeks the remedy of restitution of con fugal rights.

3. The wife who has filed a separate suit for divorce (O. S. No. 292 of 1963 out of which S. A. No. 656 of 1971 arises) has put forward defences which also form the foundation of her action for divorce. She sets up a case of neglect and cruelty and vaguely urges an irreparable breakdown of the matrimony. Issues were framed in both the suits in rather general terms, and while the trial court granted a decree for the

husband and dismissed the claim for divorce made by the wife, the appellate court concurred in the conclusions of the first court. The lady has come up in second appeal against the decrees in both the suits.

4. The case that claims logical priority is the one where divorce has been sued for. The next question turns on the right and propriety of the court granting a decree for restitution of conjugal rights as an automatic sequel to the dismissal of the divorce suit; and finally arises the point whether grounds have been made out for the restitution of conjugal rights in the event of the divorce action failing.

5. When the facts were explained, the case was postponed so that the par-ties could be sent for by the advocates with a purpose. The philosophy of justice in the matrimonial jurisdiction behoves the court to strive to restore conjugal har-mony. The family being the unit of the nation, its internal unity is the strength of the nation. So it is that the lifestyle of man-and-wife should reflect this 'inner landscape" of the Indian community. A Judge may, and I even think should, actively stimulate a rapprochement process without involvement in any specific proposal, in the spirit of S.23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act and I acted on this basis. Counsel did their part to help heal the marital wounds, fancied and real, but could not make much headway. The Assistant Registrar of the Court, a gracious lady, took the estranged parties into her room at my request and tactfully reasoned with them to motivate a reunion. However, these reconciliation efforts were baulked and arguments had to be revived. Now to the points I have set out earlier.

6. The parties are Muslims and the case is governed by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, Act 8 of 1.939, which is a consolidating statute, although it has also been assumed in some cases that the Act is a declaratory one. S.2 sets out the grounds entitling a woman to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage and the plaintiff has relied upon sub-sections (ii) and (viii). The former makes her eligible for divorce if her husband has neglected