The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of 'other authorities' in Art.12 of the Constitution, emphasizing the need for an authority to be invested with sovereign powers and the authority's ability to administer and enforce laws, including the imposition of restrictions on fundamental rights.

1. The short question in this petition is whether in all the circumstances of the case, this Court will be justified in giving a direction to the 1st respondent, the Coffee Board, constituted under the Coffee Act, 1942, to dispose of the representations Exts. P3 and P4 made by the two petitioners against a list of the employees of the Coffee Board appended to an order Ext. P2 as well as against the confirmation of respondents 2 to 7 as Chief Coffee Inspectors by an order Ext. P7 dated 1110 1966 be heard and disposed of by orders as also a direction that the representations made by some respondents be heard and disposed of by orders.

2. I shall presently refer to the facts in so far as they are necessary for the disposal of the case but I must first deal with the arguments advanced on behalf of the Coffee Board by counsel that no application under Art.226 of the Constitution would lie as the Coffee Board at best can only be said to be a statutory authority and there being no failure by the statutory authority to comply with any rule or law, there can be no question of this Court exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. The answer to this contention is that the Coffee Board is "the State" as defined in Art.12 of the Constitution of India. I must decide this question first before I consider the other aspects.

3. The Board has the power to appoint its own employees (vide S.7 of the Coffee Act, 1942). Whether the Board is "other authority" within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution has to be decided by this Court on the basis of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board. Jaipur v. Mohan Lal and others (AIR. 1967 S.C.1857). By that decision it has been established that the expression "other authorities" in Art.12 of the Constitution need not be construed ejusdem generis with the expressions that preceded "other authorities". It is laid down that there is no common genus between the authorities mentioned in Art.12 of the Constitution and a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1963) 1 S. C. R.778) is quoted with approval. After deciding this question, their Lordships proceeded to lay down the criterion for deciding what authorities can be said to be "other authorities" within the meaning of those words occurring in Art.12 of the Constitution. The relevant part of the judgment is in these terms:

"These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression "other authorities" in Art.12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or

business as mentioned in Art.19 (1)(g).

In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Art.12 and one of Directive Principles laid down in Art.46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The State, as defined in Art.12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Art.298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word "State" as used in Art.12 On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence: In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cas