Judges : K.SADASIVAN
BEERA KOYA - Appellant
Versus
ALI KOYA - Respondent
Case No : C. R. P. No. 827 of 1971
Decided On : 12/16/1971
Advocates Appeared :
K. P. K. Menon; For Petitioner S. N. Poti; For Respondent
Rent Control Act - Jurisdiction - S.11(2), (3) and (4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act - S.20 - Notification No. 3512/59/pw. (CC. 2) dated 1st July, 1959 - The court discussed the nature of the duties of the authority appointed as Rent Control Court, the interpretation of the notification, and the distinction between persona designata and court in exercising jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Addl. Munsiff had jurisdiction based on the notification and dismissed the revision petition.
Fact of the Case:
The landlord filed for eviction under S.11 (2), (3) and (4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and eviction was ordered by the Rent Controller on the ground of sub-letting. The tenants appealed, arguing lack of jurisdiction of the Addl. Munsiff who dealt with the matter.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Addl. Munsiff had jurisdiction based on the notification appointing Munsiffs as Rent Control Courts, and the belief entertained by the Munsiff cannot be said to be without basis.
Issues: The issues included the jurisdiction of the Addl. Munsiff, the nature of duties of the authority appointed as Rent Control Court, and the interpretation of the notification.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the notification appointing Munsiffs as Rent Control Courts and the distinction between persona designata and court in exercising jurisdiction.
Final Decision: The revision petition was dismissed.
1. The tenants, defeated in all the courts below, have come up in revision. Against them the 'landlord filed R. C. O. P. No. 304/66 under S.11 (2), (3) and (4) (i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (shortly stated the Act) for eviction. Eviction was ordered by the Rent Controller on the ground of sub-letting; the other grounds were all found in favour of the tenants. This order of the Rent Controller stands confirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the District Judge in revision. The learned counsel has pressed before this court a new ground which was never taken by him in any of the courts below. The ground is that the Addl. Munsiff who dealt with the matter was not competent to deal with the case, as under the relevant notification creating the court of the Rent Controller, the Addl. Munsiff is excluded in stations where there are more Munsiffs than one. According to the learned counsel, the Principal Munsiff at the station alone can assume jurisdiction of the Rent Controller in such a situation. This lack of jurisdiction, according to the learned counsel, has vitiated the whole proceedings. The other question, viz., the question regarding sub-letting, having concurrently been found by all the courts against the revision petitioner, I do not think can be considered again by this court in revision; as a matter of fact the question of jurisdiction alone was seriously pressed before me.
2. Stated briefly, the argument of the learned counsel is that "all though the person appointed to function as the Rent Control Court is a Munsiff, his appointment to such post under the Act is as persona designata, and he will be functioning only as such and not as a court while exercising jurisdiction as Rent Control Court". The same is the position with the Appellate Authority also; but the position is different when we come to S.20 of the Act. because there the remedy by way of revision is to be sought from the District Court or the High Court. In other words, in exercising the revisional power under the section, the Revisional Authority functions as a court and not as a persona designata, while both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority functions as persona designata. For this position the learned counsel relied on the Full Bench decisions of this court in Balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan (1968 KLT. 8-FB) and Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT. 583-FB). Against this position the other side would argue that a persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. Personae designatae are persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges. Instead of merely describing the designation of the post held by the officer, the argument is that the person who is to fill the post should be mentioned by name. For this position reliance is placed on Central Talkies, Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad (AIR. 1961 SC. 606), which was followed in Mohan v. Abrol (AIR. 1971 J. & K. 76) and other decisions. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision observed:
"The argument that the District Magistrate was a persona designata cannot be accepted. Under the definition of 'District Magistrate.' the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is 'a person who is pointed or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character'. (Se; Osborn's concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C. J., in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao-AIR. 1924 Mad 561 FB , personae designatae are 'persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as judges.' The
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