The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Valan Community follows a customary law of inheritance, and the widow does not inherit her husband's property under this customary law. Additionally, the court interpreted the definition of 'Kudikidappukaran' under the Kerala Land Reforms Act and concluded that the widow was entitled to the protection of the Act.

1. I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Isaac, J. I agree with the conclusion reached in that judgment. But I regret I am unable to agree with the view that there is no customary law in the matter of inheritance applicable to the Valan Community. In Thommen v. Konnunni (1955 KLT. 564) it was decided that a daughter is not an heir and in Kuttan v. Neelakandan (1966 KLT. 790) it was ruled that in the Valan Community Marumakkathayee heirs do not exclude the Makkathayee heirs and that the Valans follow the Makkathayam system of inheritance. Both these decisions proceed on the basis that in the matter of inheritance the Valan Community has a customary law and the Hindu Law is not applicable. Reliance has been placed on the History of Kerala by Mr. Padmanabha Menon, the Cochin State Manual by Achutha Menon, the Cochin Tribes and Castes by Ananthakrishna Iyer, Castes and Tribes of Southern India by Edgar Thurston and the Travancore State Manual by Velu Pillai and other publications. These are not of course treatises on law. But they do give, to the extent to which they go, the practises and customs followed by the castes and tribes dealt with therein and thus afford " such reasonably clear proof as the court will, in the circumstances of each case, insist upon for proving any other fact", (vide 25 Cochin 584, 39 Cochin 19). In this connection a passage from the decision in 1955 KLT. 564 may usefully be extracted:

"I am prepared to assume that the Hindu Law as such is not applicable to the Valans and that as a result the standard of proof required to establish a rule of customary law in their community 'need not come up to the standard required for making out a custom in derogation of a known body of antecedent law postulated to be generally binding such as the Hindu Law or the Mahomedan Law' and that all that is required 'is such reasonably clear proof as the court will, in the circumstances of cash case, insist upon for proving any other fact.' See 25 Cochin 584 and 39 Cochin 19. In other words, as stated in the latter case the evidence adduced in support of the custom need not be 'subjected to those well known tests which are applied to the case of an alleged custom contrary to, or in derogation of, the ordinary law, but should be viewed merely as evidence adduced to show what is the rule of the customary law itself and 'in any enquiry into what the customary law of the patties is we do not start with any bias in favour of a particular view that daughters are or are not entitled to succeed along with the sons and see whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to displace it. The enquiry itself is what is the customary law of the community, and this has to be ascertained, like any other question of fact on the evidence in the case. If the court comes to the conclusion that a certain customary law has been proved, then that is their law which the court must apply to them. If not, then the court will, in the absence of proof of what their law is, apply to them rules of justice, equity and good conscience. This in fact, is the ratio of the decision in Kochi v. Raman (21 Cochin 1)."

2. In the case of the Valan Community when it is seen on a reference to the publications referred to that there is a customary law of inheritance it is the above passage that is apposite and not that in 1967 KLT. 395 that a custom can receive the recognition of the court only when there is satisfactory proof of usage

"so long and invariably acted upon in practice, as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of the particular family, class, district or country; and the course of practice upon which the custom rests must not be left in doubt, but be proved with certainty."

3. Relying on the passages from the publications referred to in the two decisions, 1955 KLT. 564 and 1966 KLT. 790, and on these decisions, the correctness of which, with respect, I do not see any grounds to doubt, parti