The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for the plaintiff to prove readiness and willingness to take the sale deed in a specific performance suit, the proper constitution of the appeal, and the court's discretion in allowing the impleading of further parties under Order XLI R.20.

1. These appeals against second appeals arise from two suits, O.S. Nos. 329 and 340 of 1121 on the file of Munsiff's Court, Ettum-anoor. O.S. No. 329 of 1121, from which A.S. No. 410 of 1965 arises, was filed for specific performance of an agreement to sell the plaint schedule property entered into by the 1st defendant in the suit with the plaintiff. The 1st defenant thereafter gifted the property to his wife, the 2nd defendant, and defendants 1 and 2 sold the property to the 3rd defendant. The prayer in the suit was to compel the 1st defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on receipt of the amount stipulated to be paid under agreement to sell.

2. A.S. No. 409 of 1962 arisee from OS. No. 340 of 1121. That was a suit filed for redemption by the 3rd defendant in OS. No. 329 of 1121 against the plaintiff in that suit on the strength of a possessory mortgage for Rs. 225/-and the result of this suit was mainly dependent upon the suit for specific performance.

3. The trial court held that time was the essence of the contract and since the plaintiff in OS. No. 329 of 1121 had not paid the amount and demanded execution of the document within the time stipulated under the agreement to sell, the suit was not maintainable. The trial Court further found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that she had been willing and ready to perform her part of the contract and so was not entitled to specific performance. For both these reasons, the suit was dismissed by the trial Court. As a consequence, OS. No. 340 of 1121 was decreed by the trial Court for redemption.

4. In appeal, the Subordinate Judge while confirming the finding of the trial Court that the time stipulated in the agreement to sell was of the essence of the contract found that the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform her" part of the contract at all relevant time and so reversed the decision of the trial Court. As a natural consequence, the suit for redemption was dismissed.

5. Both matters were taken in second appeal and a learned Single Judge of this Court reversed the decisions of the Subordinate Judge in both the cases and held that the plaintiff in O.S. No. 329 of 1121 was not entitled to specific performance on the ground that she did not prove that she had been ready and willing to take the sale deed on payment of the balance amount stipulated. The learned Single Judge therefore set aside the decree for specific performance and restored the decree of the first court in O.S. No. 329 of 1121. So far as O.S. No. 340 of 1121 was concerned, the learned Single Judge noticed that the appeal had not been heard on merits by the Subordinate Judge, and therefore, directed it to be sent back to the Subordinate Judge, for disposal on merits. On leave granted by the learned Single Judge, these appeals came up for hearing before a Division Bench, to which one of us was a party.

6. A preliminary objection was raised by the respondent in A.S. No. 410 of 1965 that the appeal has not been properly constituted in that the legal representatives of the 1st defendant, who were impleaded as supplemental defendants 4 to 8 in O.S. No. 32) of 1121 as also the 2nd defendant had not been made parties to the appeal and therefore the appeal was not sustainable as the necessary parties were not before the Court. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on two decisions of this Court, namely, Gouri Amma v. Gopalakrishna Panicker 1966 KLT. 715 Gopala Pillai v. Chellappan Pillai 1966 KLT. 1154 where objections similar to those raised in these appeals had been upheld. For the appellant, it was contended that under Order XLI R.20 the Court had jurisdiction to implead the necessary parties and that the appeal could not be dismissed straightaway as ill-constituted. The Division Bench felt that this aspect had not been considered in the two decisions earlier cited and that it was necessary that it should be decided by a Full Bench. As