The original court has inherent power to amend a decree to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions, even if the decree and judgment have been confirmed, varied, or reversed by an appellate court.

1. The revision petition has been referred to a Division Bench by Krishna Iyer J„ as our learned brother felt that the decision of the Supreme Court in Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag (AIR. 1967 SC. 1440) struck a different note from the decision of Vaidialingam J. of this Court in P.Kesavan v. Vazhoor Gopalan (19641 KLR. 155). Krishna Iyer J. wrote a judgment following the ruling of Vaidialingam J. when the counsel of the respondent was absent; and then our learned brother heard the counsel of the respondent who cited the ruling of the Supreme Court. It was thereafter that the reference to a Division Bench was made.

2. To us it appears that the question is fairly simple; and what is required is only a little clarification.

3. The respondent filed a suit with two prayers: one, a prayer for injunction restraining the defendants (the petitioner being the second defendant) from preventing the flow of a canal or altering its nature; and two, a prayer for restoring the status quo ante of the canal if the defendants had already closed it or changed its course The suit was decreed as prayed for. But, in the decree drafted by the ministerial staff of the court only the first relief was included. At the execution stage the respondent prayed for an amendment of the decree by including the second relief as well The Munsiff allowed the prayer; and the revision petition is against that order.

4. The decision of this Court by Vaidialingam J. has held that when an order is confirmed, modified or reversed by an appellate or revisional authority, the operative order is the appellate or revisional order and not the original order; and that in such a case the proper forum for seeking an amendment of the decree is not the original court but the appellate court. This proposition is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. M/s Amritlal Bhogilal & Co.(AIR.1958 SC. 868), where Gajendragadkar J., speaking for the Court, has said in Para.10 of the judgment that there can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law; that if the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced; that in law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal; that, as a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority,the original decision merges in the appellate decision; and that it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement. From this Vaidialingam J. has taken one more step and has held: that in such a case the proper forum for amending the decree is the appellate court.

5. The decision of the Supreme Court which impelled Krishna Iyer J. to make the reference is Samarendra Nath Sinha's case already mentioned. In Para.11 of this ruling Shelat J., speaking for the Court, has observed that it is well settled that there is an inherent power in the court which passed the judgment to correct a clerical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission and to vary its judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and intention. In this paragraph the learned judge has considered this question further and has followed the English decision in In re Swire: Mellor v. Swire (1885) 30 Ch D. 239). Bowen L. J. has said in that decision:

"Every Court has inherent power over its own records so long as those records are within its power and it can set right any mistake in them. It seems to me that it would be perfectly shocking if the court could not rectify an error which is really the error of its own minister. An order, as it seems to me, even when passed and entered) may be amended by the court so as to carry out the intention and express t