The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of adhering to the principles of natural justice, including the obligation to act judicially, before exercising the power to wind up a cooperative society. The judgment emphasized the importance of notice and an opportunity to be heard, even in administrative actions, and highlighted the serious civil consequences of a winding-up order.

1. The petitioner challenges an order passed by the Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies under S.51 (1) of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 (Act X of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the Act, winding up the co-operative society in question and appointing a liquidator to manage its affairs. The appeal preferred before the Government against the order was dismissed by Ext. P-2 order.

2. The only contention raised by the petitioner is that the society should have been given notice of the proceeding to wind it up and as no such notice was given, the proceeding is bad. S.51 (1) of the Act is as follows:

"If the Registrar, after an enquiry has been held under S.45 or after an inspection has been made under S.46 or on receipt of an application made by three-fourths of the members of a registered society, is of opinion that the society ought to be wound up, he may i;sue an order in writing directing it to be wound up, and when necessary appoint a liquidator for the purpose and fix his remuneration."

It is contended that though the Act does not specifically provide for notice being given to a society, rules of natural justice require such a notice before an order is passed under the sub-section.

3. In Bhagwan v. Ram Chand AIR 1965 SC. 1767 the Supreme Court said that an obligation to act judicially may in some cases be inferred from the relevant statute and its material provisions, that in such a case, the authority or body must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its powers; that the obligation to follow the principles of natural justice need not be expressly imposed and that power to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the, principles of natural justice.

4. In Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C. B. N. S.180 under an Act of 1855 it was provided that no one might put up a building in London without giving seven days' notice to the local Board of Works. If any one did so, it was provided, that the Board of Works might have the building demolished. A builder, nevertheless, began to build a house in Wandsworth without having given the requisite notice, and when his building had reached the second storey, the Board of Works sent men late in the evening who demolished it. The Board did what the Act said they might do in exactly the circumstances in which the Act said they might do it. And their action was, of course, purely administrative. Nevertheless, the builder brought a successful action for damages for the injury to his building, and won it merely on the ground that the Board had no power to act without first asking him what he had to say for himself. Erle, C. J. said:

"I think the Board ought to have given notice to the plaintiff and to have allowed him to be heard. The default in sending notice to the Board of the intention to build, is a default which may be explained. There may be a great many excuses for the apparent default. The party may have intended to conform to the law. He may have actually conformed though by accident his notice may have miscarried. I cannot conceive any harm that could happen to the District Board from hearing the party before they subjected him to a loss so serious as the demolition of his house; but I can conceive a great many advantages which might arise in the way of public order, in the way of doing substantial justice, and in the way of fulfilling the purposes of the statute, by the restriction which we put upon them, that they should hear the party before they inflict upon him such a heavy loss. I fully agree that the Legislature intended to give the District Board very large powers indeed: but the qualification I speak of is one which has been recognised to the full extent. It has been said that the principle is limited to a judicial proceeding, and that a District Board ordering a house to be pu