The acquittal in criminal cases does not preclude disciplinary proceedings, as the standard of proof and objectives differ between criminal trials and disciplinary proceedings.

1. The petitioner was a lower division clerk in the Land Revenue Department. From 1946 to 1953 he was working as Head Clerk in the office of the Administrative Officer, Wynad Land Colonisation Scheme, Ambalavayal. In 1955 the police took up a case against him for certain 'irregularities alleged to have been committed by him in the discharge of his official duties. He was charged with offences punishable under S.409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. He was convicted of the offences by the Magistrate Kalpetta; but was acquitted in appeal. In view of the pendency of the criminal case, the petitioner was suspended by the Collector of Malabar by Ex. P1 order. Although the petitioner was acquitted in appeal, no order was passed reinstating him in service. Thereafter, for irregularities alleged to have been committed by him in keeping the accounts of the office from 2131950 to 21-3-1951, four criminal cases were filed against him by the police before the Munsiff - Magistrate, Kalpetta. On 1411960 he was again acquitted of the charges. Yet again, on 26 21961 he was charged by the police before the Magistrate in three cases in connection with irregularities in maintaining the accounts but in these cases also he was acquitted in 1962. On 5101963 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him in respect of the subject matter of the police charges and the charges were directed to be enquired into under the Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal R.1960. An enquiry was conducted by the Tribunal and the report of the enquiry finding the petitioner guilty of the charges was sent to Government. The Government agreed with the findings of the Tribunal in the report, and issued a show cause notice why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed on him. The petitioner submitted his explanation, and thereafter Government passed Ex. P7 order on 23 61967 dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 8 2 1956, the date on which he was suspended.

2. Ex. P7 order was impeached on three grounds: Counsel said that the petitioner was not a servant of the Kerala State as he was not finally allotted to the Kerala State in accordance with the provisions of the States Re-organisation Act, and therefore, the Kerala State had no jurisdiction to take disciplinary proceedings against him, that the supplementary representation filed by the petitioner on 15 4 67 (Ex. P6) before the disciplinary authority was not considered by the authority in passing Ex. P7 order, and that the disciplinary proceedings were barred in view of the orders of acquittal passed by the criminal court on substantially the same charges.

3. It is the last contention which was pressed most strenuously by counsel and I would deal with it in the first instance. The argument of counsel was that the doctrine of issue estoppel was attracted to the case and that since the petitioner was acquitted by the criminal court on identical charges, the findings in the criminal cases would operate as res judicata against Government and would preclude evidence being led to prove the facts in issue in the disciplinary proceeding as regards which evidence has already been led and findings entered by the criminal Court. Counsel said that there is no reason why the doctrine of issue estoppel should be confined to the trial of an issue in a subsequent criminal case.

4. In Manipur Administration v. Bira Singh, AIR. 1965 S. C. 87 the Supreme Court explained the doctrine as follows:

"The rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute as estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a di