Eradi, J.

1. The plaintiffs are the appellants. In this appeal we are concerned only with plaint items 1 to 5 of A schedule properties. These items belonged to the Marumakkathayam joint family of the plaintiffs. They were originally allotted to the tavazhi of their mother Pennamma in a partition in their tarwad. Pennamma died sometime in 1941 leaving the two plaintiffs, both minors, as the sole surviving members of the joint family. On 9-6-1943 when the plaintiffs were minors, their father the 4th defendant, purporting to act as their guardian and their maternal grandparents sold the properties to the 1st defendant by Ext. P1 and put him in possession. The suit was for recovery of possession of the properties after setting aside the sale deed for the reason that the executants were incompetent in law to alienate the properties and it was filed in forma pauperis on 1-e-1954.

e. The 1st defendant gifted the properties to his children, defendants 5 and 6, by Ext. D6 dated 7-10-1949.

2. The courts below have found that Ext. D6 came into effect and that defendants 5 and 6 got possession thereunder When the suit was filed on 1-e-1954, the 1st plaintiff had attained the age of 21, but the 2nd plaintiff was a minor, as he was only 14 years old. Defendants 5 and 6 were made parties to the suit on 9-8-1955, and so the suit can be regarded as brought against them only on the date when they were impleaded by virtue of S.22 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In other words, they were impleaded in the suit more than three years after the 1st plaintiff became major and had thereupon become the manager of the family.

3. Both the courts below held that the suit to recover possession of these items was barred by limitation. They apparently relied upon S.7 and 8 of the Limitation Act. 1908, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to come to that conclusion.

4. The main question for consideration in this appeal is whether by the combined operation of S.7 and 8, the suit so far as these items are concerned was barred by limitation. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that even if plaintiffs 1 and 2 were jointly entitled to institute a suit and that the 1st plaintiff became capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the 2nd plaintiff when he became major and the manager of the family on 1-e-1951, the suit was within time, as 12 years had not elapsed from that date. It is not disputed that since the persons who executed the sale deed had no authority in law to sell the properties the plaintiffs were entitled to ignore the sale and recover the properties, and that the Article applicable is Art.142 of the Act. So the precise point for consideration is whether the plaintiffs would get a period of 12 years from the date when the 1st plaintiff became capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the 2nd plaintiff, namely, the date when he became the manager of the family on 1-e-1951, or only three years from that date. S.7 of the Act is as follows:

"Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased"

Illustrations (a) and (b) to that section read:

"(a). A incurs a debt to a firm of which B, C and D are partners, B is insane and C is a minor. D can give a discharge of the debt without the concurrence of B and C. Time runs against B, C and D.

(b) A incurs a debt to a firm of which E, F and G are partners, E and F are insane, and G is a minor. Tims will not run against any of them until E or F becomes sane or G attains majority."

Merely because two persons can join together as plaintiffs under Order I R.1 CPC. and file a suit