The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court sales become absolute only on the date when the petition to set aside the court sale was dismissed on the merits, as interpreted in Art.180 of the Indian Limitation Act.

1. This appeal by the 8th defendant raises the question of interpretation of the words "when the sale becomes absolute" occurring in the third column of Art.180 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908).

2. In execution of the decree, the decree-holder purchased decree schedule item 1 on 1191953 and decree schedule items 4 and 5 on 26 91953. The court sale in respect of item 1 was confirmed on 1110 1953. The 8th defendant filed a petition to set aside the court sale of items 1, 4 and 5 on 26-10-1953 under 0.21, R.90, C. P. C., which was dismissed for default on 19-1-1957 and the sale of items 4 and 5 was confirmed on the same date. The 8th defendant filed an application on 1121957 to restore the petition to set aside the court sale which was dismissed for default and it was restored on 5 71957. The said petition was dismissed on 19101958 on the merits. The auction purchaser filed the petition for getting delivery of items 1, 4 and 5 on 17101960. The execution court rejected the petition for delivery on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Art.180 of the Indian Limitation Act while the appellate court held that the petition for delivery was not barred since it was filed within three years of 19101958, the date of the dismissal of the petition to set aside the court sale. The appellate court took the view that the sale of items 1, 4 and 5 became absolute only on 19101958, though the orders confirming the court sales were passed

earlier. The correctness of this view taken by the appellate judge was canvassed before us.

3. Art.180 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provides that an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree should be made within three years when the sale becomes absolute. Time under Art.180 runs from the date when the sale becomes absolute. 0.21, R.92(1) of the Civil Procedure Code enacts:

"Where no application is made under R.89, R.90 or R.91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become

absolute. 11

4. The submission on behalf of the appellant was that in the case before us the confirmation of the court sale of item 1 was on 1191953 and of items 4 and 5 was on 26 91953 and therefore the sales became absolute on those dates and the petition for delivery filed beyond three years from those dates is barred by limitation.

5. In Muthu Korakkai Chetty v. Madar Ammal, ILR. 43 Madras 185 after the confirmation of court sale on the 26th April, 1913, an application was made by the judgment-debtor on the 3rd January, 1914, to set aside the court sale on the ground of fraud and the court sale was set aside on the 25th June, 1915, in respect of part of the properties sold. The auction purchaser having made an application on the 17th February, 1917, for delivery of the remaining properties, the question arose whether the application for delivery was barred by limitation under Art.180 of the Limitation Act, having been filed beyond three years from the date of the order confirming the court sale. It was held that the application was not barred under Art.180 of the Limitation Act as the time should be computed from the date of the order disposing of the petition to set aside the court sale and not from the date of the order confirming the court sale. Abdur Rahim, Officiating C. J. observed At page 198:

"The effect of entertainment of the application to set aside the sale after the order of confirmation must, having regard to the intention of the legislature as disclosed in this rule and quite apart from any general theory in such connexions, be to render the order ineffective so as to make the sale absolute. If we were to proceed upon an absolutely literal interpretation of the language of R.92 without paying due regard to the intention of the legislature, this case would have to be treated as lying outside that rule, for it requires that the order of