Executive directions from the Government do not confer legal rights, and any breach of contract should be addressed through a lawsuit.

Headnote:
Government's Executive Direction - Property Disposal - Legal Rights
Fact of the Case:

The Government issued an executive direction to grant a lease of a plot of land to the petitioner, which was later cancelled and directed to be granted to another person.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the executive directions given by the Government did not confer any legal right on the petitioner, and any alleged violation of statute or rule would need to be addressed through a lawsuit, not through Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Issues: The issues involved the legal rights of the petitioner in response to the Government's executive directions and the appropriate legal remedy for any breach of contract.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the executive directions from the Government did not confer legal rights on the petitioner, and any breach of contract should be addressed through a lawsuit, not through a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.

Judgment :-

1. We think that the learned single judge was right in declining to interfere in this case.

2. Subject to any statutory limitations and no violation of any statute or rule made thereunder is alleged Government is like any private party free to take such steps as it pleases in accordance with law for disposing of its property and for evicting trespassers thereon. The direction given by the Government by Ext. P-1 to its subordinate, the Collector, to take steps to grant a short term lease of the plot of land in question to the petitioner is a mere executive direction vesting no legal right in the petitioner. The order, Ext. P-5, cancelling Ext. P-1 and directing the Collector to grant the lease to some other person after resuming the land from the petitioner who is in occupation is again a mere executive order and does not in any way affect the legal rights of the petitioner and if it did, Ext. P-1 having vested some legal right in him, his remedy would be to sue in enforcement of that right and not move this court under Art.226 of the Constitution. No question of natural justice seems to be involved and the allegation of mala fides is irrelevant. Even if Ext. P-1 was passed after hearing the petitioner and his rival, we do not think that there is any principle of law that required Government to hear the petitioner before changing its mind and directing the Collector to grant the lease to the rival. If there is a breach of contract the petitioner must sue in enforcement of it; and it will be time enough for him to move this court under Art.226 if the land is sought to be taken from his possession or granted to his rival otherwise than in accordance with law.

3. We dismiss the appeal. Dismissed.

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