The court emphasized the duty to prevent harm to litigants and applied the restitution principle to restore parties to their position prior to the erroneous decision.

Headnote:
Writ of Certiorari - Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S.47(1)(a) - Experience gained under a permit subsequently set aside - Court's duty to prevent harm to litigants - Restitution principle - Date for assessing qualifications - Maxim 'Actus curiae neminem gravabit'
Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought to quash an order by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which directed the grant of a permit to the second respondent for operating a vehicle on a specific route. The petitioner had operated the vehicle for a period based on a permit that was subsequently set aside.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the experience gained under the subsequently set aside permit should not be considered in the assessment of qualifications at a later stage of the same proceeding. It emphasized the duty of the court to prevent harm to litigants and applied the restitution principle to restore parties to their position prior to the erroneous decision.
Issues: The main issue was whether the experience gained under a permit subsequently set aside should be considered in the assessment of qualifications at a later stage of the same proceeding.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the maxim 'Actus curiae neminem gravabit' and the restitution principle to conclude that the experience gained under the subsequently set aside permit should not be used to the detriment of the second respondent. It emphasized that the assessment of qualifications should be without reference to the previous erroneous decision granting the permit.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed without costs.

Judgment :-

1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction and quash Ext. P-1 order dated 14 51965 passed by the third respondent, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam.

2. The first respondent the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, invited applications for the issue of stage carriage permit for operating a vehicle on the route Palghat-Pazhampalakode. The petitioner and the second respondent were among the applicants. The first respondent on 29 71963 directed the issue of permit to the petitioner. The second respondent filed appeal 265 of 1963 against the said order before the third respondent. Though the third respondent passed an interim order staying the operation of the order dated 29 71963 till the disposal of the appeal it was vacated on 4101963. The petitioner in view of the cancellation of the order of interim stay was operating the vehicle in accordance with the permit granted to him by the first respondent. The appeal 265 of 1963 was subsequently allowed on 1112 1964 setting aside the grant of permit and remanding the applications of the petitioner and the second respondent for fresh consideration by the first respondent. The petitioner filed O. P. 3346 of 1964 under Art.225 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 1112 1964. Though the original petition was dismissed on 5 2 1965 this court permitted the petitioner to operate his vehicle on the route until the disposal of the applications remanded to the first respondent. The first respondent after remand directed the grant of permit to the second respondent by the order dated 8 31965 and the appeal filed by the petitioner against that order was dismissed by the third respondent by Ext. P-1 dated 14 51965.

3. The petitioner was thus operating the vehicle on the concerned route for a period of nearly one year and 5 months from 4101963 to 8 31965. The operation of the vehicle by the petitioner from 4101963 to 1112 1964 was on the basis of the permit the grant of which was subsequently set aside by the third respondent on 1112 1964.

4. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that in passing Ext. P-1 the Tribunal wrongly refused to consider the qualification and experience gained by the petitioner by operating the vehicle from 4101963 to 1112 1964 on the basis of the permit, the grant of which was eventually set aside and thereby it committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. It is agreed before us, that if the experience gained as a result of operating the vehicle from 4101963 to 1112 1964 is not to be considered Ext. P-1 order does not call for any interference. The learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed support for his plea from the decision of the full bench of this Court in C. D. M. T. E. C. S. Ltd., v. M. P. Conveyance 1962 KLT. 446 where it was observed thus:

"What is the point of time with reference to which the qualifications for a permit should be evaluated by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal? Is it the date of the application to the Regional Transport Authority? Or is it the date on which the Regional Transport Authority renders its decision? Or is it the date on which the State Transport Appellate Tribunal decides the appeal?

We have come to the conclusion that the date that is material is the date on which the Regional Transport Authority deals with the application. The earlier date the date of the application may not be in the public interest which as is evident from S.47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is the important and paramount consideration in these matters. The later date the date on which the State Transport Appellate Tribunal decides the appeal will mean an unwarranted extension of the appellate power."

5. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that since the first respondent rendered its decision only on 1112 1964, the factual experience gained by the pet

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1966 Supreme(Ker) 286

The court emphasized the duty to prevent harm to litigants and applied the restitution principle to restore parties to their position prior to the erroneous decision.

Cases Referred (1)