The main legal point established in the judgment is that the forum for institution of proceedings for dissolution of a marriage, even under the Travancore Nayar Act, is the District Court as defined in the Hindu Marriage Act.

1. This Civil Revision Petition has arisen in a proceeding before the Subordinate Judge, Trichur, for restitution of conjugal rights instituted under S.9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, by a Nair husband. The wife in her turn has moved a petition before the Munsiff, Perumbavoor, for divorce under the Travancore Nayar Act, 1100. Both the petitions have been filed in 1965 and are pending trial. On November 15,1965, the wife sought stay of the former proceedings against her under S.151 CPC., but was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. She has therefore come up for a revision of that order.

2. Obviously, if the two petitions abovesaid are tried by different Courts and they arrive at different conclusions thereon it may lead to an absurd state of affairs. The husband would compel the wife to conjugal union and the wife would refuse to see him, under the respective decrees in their favour. The circumstances therefore call for a joint or contemporaneous trial in the same Court of both the petitions.

It is pointed out that a petition for divorce under the Travancore Nayar Act is to be tried by a Munsiff with help of delegates appointed for his Court and that therefore a transfer of the proceedings to another Court is difficult. Under the Hindu Marriage Act, a matrimonial petition can be moved only in a District Court as defined in the Act which, in this State, would include a Sub Court as well, because of a notification by the State Government. But, without a transfer of the petition for divorce from the Munsiff's Court to the District Court, the calamity mentioned above cannot be avoided. It is my experience at the bar that in cases that arose in the erstwhile Travancore of a petition for divorce and a counter-suit for restitution of conjugal rights they were tried jointly before the District Judge in whose Court the suit for restitution of conjugal rights lay.

3. In the light of the above facts, I proceed to examine the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955-1964. The relevant provisions of the Act read thus:

"S. 4 Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,

(a)

(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.

S.29.(1)

(2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect any right recognised by custom or conferred by any special enactment to obtain the dissolution of a Hindu marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act.

(3) Nothing contain in this Act shall affect any proceeding under any law for the time being in force for... dissolving any marriage.... pending at the commencement of this Act, and any such proceeding may be continued and determined as if this Act had not been passed."

The provision in the Nayar Act allowing institution of a petition for divorce in the Court of a Munsiff, being inconsistent with the provision of the Hindu Marriage Act prescribing such petitions to be presented to a District Court has to be taken as repealed under S.4 (2) unless it is saved, as is contended at the bar, by S.29 (2) of the latter Act. S.29 (2) refers to and saves 'a right to obtain dissolution of a marriage'. A right to a particular relief is different from a provision of procedural law for enforcement thereof. Under the Nayar Act, a right to obtain dissolution of a marriage may be worked out by execution of a registered instrument: no petition to a Court is then needed. The provision of the Nayar Act permitting execution of a registered instrument of divorce by mutual consent not being inconsistent with any provision of the Hindu Marriage Act is not within the repeal of S.4 (2). A right to obtain dissolution of a marriage arises when particular causes occur. The law that enumerates such causes as may give rise to the right is different from the law that prescribes the forum for institution of proceedings to enforce it. In my view, what is saved by S.29