The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, specifically S.13 and S.20, were applied to determine the validity and effect of a gift deed, resulting in the entire properties vesting in the second defendant and the first plaintiff as tenants-in-common.

1. These second appeals arise out of the same suit. The first case is by the first defendant; and the second one is by plaintiffs 2 and 3. There is a memorandum of cross-objections in the first case by the same plaintiffs 2 and 3, so that the memorandum of cross-objections and the second of these cases involve the same questions. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but decreed by the lower appellate court in part.

2. The suit properties originally belonged to the father of the second defendant, who was the grandfather of the first plaintiff. The third defendant is the wife of the second defendant. The grandfather executed Ex. P1 in 1114, a gift deed, by which the suit properties were given to the second defendant, the first plaintiff, who was then a minor, and the children to be born thereafter to the second defendant. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the children subsequently born to the second defendant. I may also mention at this stage that the parties are Nairs. The donor reserved a life interest with him; and after his death the second defendant for himself and the third defendant as guardian of the first plaintiff, who was still a minor, executed Ex. P2 in 1117 selling the properties to the first defendant. The suit was filed by the three plaintiffs to set aside the alienation and to recover possession of the properties from the alienee, the first defendant. The trial court, as already stated, dismissed the suit, while the lower appellate court held that since the gift was to two living persons and also to other unborn persons, the gift in favour of the unborn persons was invalid and the gift enured only for the benefit of the two living persons, namely, the second defendant and the first plaintiff. The lower appellate court further held that they held the entire properties as tenants-in-common, so that under Ex. P2 the second defendant's half share passed to the first defendant and the half share of the first plaintiff did not pass, as he was not represented by his legal guardian. It is against this decision of the lower appellate court that both the second appeals have been filed.

3. The counsel of the appellant in the first of these cases argues that the lower appellate court should have considered the effect of the fact that the second defendant, the father of the first plaintiff, was also a party to Ex. P2, though not as the guardian of the first plaintiff. The counsel also argues that the lower appellate court should have considered whether there was binding consideration and necessity for the sale.

4. In Ex. P2 the consideration shown is Rs. 285/-, of which a sum of Rs. 30/- is said to be the the arrears of karom due to the jenmi. Another sum of Rs. 21/- is said to have been taken to meet the expenses of the obsequies of the donor; and the balance is reserved with the alienee for purchasing properties in the future for the vendors. (There is controversy regarding the said reserved amount. According to the appellant, the said amount was utilised for making four purchases in the name of the vendors: but, according to the first plaintiff, he is not in possession of any of the properties alleged to have been purchased. I may state that it is not established that the first plaintiff is in possession of any of the said properties. I may also point out that even if the case of the alienee is accepted, still, three of the four purchases were only of mortgage rights. Ex. P2 does not mention anything about the existence of the Otti evidenced by Ex. D2 said to have been executed by the donor in favour of the alienee, under which the alienee was directed to pay a previous Otti evidenced by Ex. D1 to a Kesavan. The alienee has however produced evidence to show that he discharged Kesavan's Otti. Ex. D2 recites that the properties were with tenants and that Kesavan was directed to recover possession from them, which he failed to do. Still, Ex. P2 recites that at the time of the document the properties were in the direct po