The main legal point established in the judgment is that the power to set aside an ex parte order must be explicitly conferred by the statute or rules.

1. The only point argued in this writ petition is whether the Land Tribunal functioning under the Kerala Act 1 of 1964 has power to restore an application for fixation of fair rent which had been dismissed by it for default on the part of the petitioners. The landlord-respondent who has been aggrieved by an order of restoration passed by the Land Tribunal is the petitioner in this O. P.

2. It was ruled by Vaidialingam J. in O. P. No. 2245 of 1962 that the Land Tribunal under the Kerala Act 4 of 1961 has no jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order. It was also ruled by Mathew J. in Ammad Haji v. Kelu (1966 KLT. 819) that the Land Tribunal functioning under Act 1 of 1964, is not authorised to set aside an ex parte order for fixation of fair rent, under R.182 of the Kerala Agrarian Relations R.1961. These decisions appear to directly cover the point in favour of the petitioner, but counsel for the respondents maintained contra. S.101 of the Act confers certain enumerated powers on the Land Tribunal and leaves others to be prescribed by Rules. The power to set aside an ex parte order is not one of the enumerated powers conferred by the section. R.60 prescribes certain additional powers as contemplated by the section; but the disputed power is not conferred even by the said rule. Counsel for the respondents argued that the said power is comprised in the comprehensive expression, "such other interlocutory orders, as may appear to the Tribunal to be just and necessary to meet the ends of justice". I cannot agree that the power to set aside an ex parte order is comprehended within the scope of the above expression.

3. R.114 (C) was next relied on. By the said rule, a power to set aside ex parte orders is conferred on the "authorised officer". It was argued that such power should a fortiori be available to the Land Tribunal. The existence of the power must be spelt out from the terms of the statute and not on a fortiori considerations.

4. The difference in language between R.99 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) R.1964 and R.182 of the Rules framed under Act 4 of 1961, noticed by my learned brother Mathew J. in 1966 KLT. 819 was stressed. By R.99, the Land Tribunal was enjoined to follow the procedure as regards applications "in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rules made thereunder". I do not think the addition of the underlined words enlarges the content of R.99.

5. I hold that the Land Tribunal had no power to set aside the ex parte order and that the order in question (Ext. P2) was without jurisdiction.

6. I allow this O. P. and quash Ex. P2. No order as to costs. Allowed.