The main legal point established in the judgment is the construction and interpretation of the Court Fees Act, specifically regarding the valuation of the subject matter and the applicability of Art.1 of Schedule I and Art.17-B of Schedule II.

1. This second appeal is in a suit instituted in the Malabar area in 1948. Therefore, by reason of S.87(2) of Madras Act XIV of 1955 and S.87(2) of Kerala Act 10 of 1960, the court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal is governed by the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as in force in Madras in 1948. The suit is for partition, but the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal is capable of being valued in terms of money and has, indeed, been valued at Rs. 50,000 and odd in the memorandum of appeal. The question is whether the court-fee payable is an ad valerom fee under Art.1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as amended in Madras, or a fixed fee under Art.17-B of Schedule II.

2. The first column of Art.1 of Schedule I runs as follows: "Plaint or written statement pleading a set off or counter-claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) presented to any Civil or Revenue Court"

And the second column clearly shows that the article can apply only in cases where the subject-matter in dispute can be valued in money.

Article 17-B of Schedule II runs thus:

"Plaint or memorandum of appeal in every suit where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for by this Act."

It will be noticed that the disclaimer, "not otherwise provided for by this Act" appears in both the articles so much so that when it comes to deciding which article applies, the disclaimer in the one cancels out that in the other. For, to show that Art.1 of Schedule I applies you have to show that no other provision of the Act applies, in other words that Art.17-B of Schedule II, which is the only other provision that can conceivably apply, does not apply. But to show that we have to show that some other provision of the Act, in other words Art.1 of Schedule I applies! And vice versa! Therefore we might as well read the two articles as if the clause, "not otherwise provided for in this Act" did not appear in either. So read, there can be no doubt whatsoever of the applicability of Art.1 of Schedule I, for, this is indisputably a memorandum of appeal presented to a civil court where the value of the subject-matter in dispute can be estimated in money. Regarding the applicability of Art.17-B of Schedule II, there is conflict of authority the view taken in Veluchami Pillai v. Sankaralingam Pillai A.I.R.1950 Madras 353 and Kamalam v. Saradambal 1953 (1) M.L.J. 135 following Fyotibati Chaudhurain v. Lakshmeshwar Prasad Chaudhuri I.L.R. 8 Patna 818 and Fyoti Prasad Singha Deo v. Fogendra Ram Ray I.L.R. 56 Calcutta 188 is that it does apply, while the view taken in Kadiyala Peravadhannulu v. Kadiyala Peravadhannulu A.I.R. 1950 Madras 26 and in In re Krishnappa Chettiar 1941 (2) M.L.J. Short Notes 92 is that it does not. Thus, it would appear that while the applicability of Art.1 of Schedule I is certain on authority the applicability of Art.17 B of Schedule II is uncertain. It should therefore follow that Article I of Schedule I must be applied. And if there two possible ways of reading Art.17-B of Schedule II, that must be chosen which does not bring it into conflict with Art.1 of Schedule I.

3. It is said that Art.1 of Schedule I is a general provision while Art.17-B of Schedule II is a special provision and that in cases where the latter applies it excludes the application of the former. I see little substance in this argument, for, it seems to me that both the articles are equally general or equally special. While Art.1 of Schedule I provides for cases where the subject-matter in dispute is capable of being valued in money, Art.17-B of Schedule II provides for cases where it is not capable of being so valued.

4. But, construing Art.17-B of Schedule II for myself, unaided by authority, I have little doubt that it does not apply in this case for the simple reason that it is possible to estimate at a money value of the subject-matter in dispute, and, if I may sa