The main legal point established in the judgment is that under the Land Conservancy Act, a person treated as a trespasser can only claim value for improvements falling within the ambit of S.9 of the Act. The court clarified that trees do not fall within the ambit of the section and that the value of the type of improvements mentioned in the section can be lost only when a specific order of forfeiture envisaged by the section had been passed.

1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff. The suit was for recovery of two lakhs of Rupees, with interest thereon from the date of suit, from the first defendant in the suit, the State of Kerala. Shortly stated, the claim was for damages for the value of improvements said to have been lost to the plaintiff when he was evicted from 160 acres of land, described in the schedule to the plaint, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Conservancy Act, on the 8th of Karkitakom, 1114 M.E. It is now admitted that the land belonged to the State. According to the plaintiff those improvements had been effected by him bona fide on the property and he was entitled to the value thereof. He should have been allowed at least to remove the improvements. Because no value was given to him for the improvements and because he was not even allowed to remove his improvements, its value as detailed in the plaint has been claimed by way of damages. This claim was resisted by the State, the first defendant, on several grounds and various issues have been framed. The court below granted a decree to the appellant for Rs. 3000/ which amount was fixed as the value of the building in the property, against the State, and the suit was dismissed in other respects. Regarding the rest of the claim it was held that the categories of improvements in relation to which the plaintiff, who was treated to be a trespasser, could claim value are restricted to those that fall within the ambit of S.9 of the Land Conservancy Act of 1091. The court below was of the view that trees will not fall within the ambit of the section and it was further held that there was no proof that there were "crops or other products" at the time of the eviction. The right to the value of the type of improvements mentioned in the section which is in these terms

"Any person unauthorisedly occupying any land for which he is liable to pay a fine under S.6 and an assessment or prohibitory assessment under S.7, may be summarily evicted by the Division Peishkar, and any crop or other product raised on the land shall be liable to forfeiture and any building or other structure erected or anything deposited thereon shall also, if not removed by him after such written notice as the Division Peishkar may deem reasonable, be liable to forfeiture. Forefeiture under this Section shall be adjudged by the Division Peishkar and any property so forfeited shall be disposed of as the Division Peishkar may direct."

can be lost it was held, only when a specific order of forfeiture envisaged by the section had been passed. There being no order of forfeiture in the case the value of the building was awarded to the plaintiff.

2. On the issue relating to the contention that the suit was barred by limitation, the finding was in favour of the plaintiff. There were also a number of other issues framed:

Issue 7. Whether the suit is barred by the judgment and decree in O. S.156 of 1103?, Issue 8. Whether the suit is barred by S.18 of the Land Conservancy Act? and

It 9. Whether any notice of suit was issued by plaintiff? Whether the suit is not maintainable?

and the findings on these issues are in favour of the plaintiff. The findings on these issues have become final as they have not been challenged.

Issue No. 5 in the case related to the claim of the appellant against the second defendant. This was found against the plaintiff-appellant and has not been appealed against. This too has therefore become final.

3. Thus the only two questions arising for determination in this appeal are:

(1) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the value of improvements which mainly, if not entirely, are in the nature of trees? And

(2) whether the suit is barred by Limitation? We shall deal with the second of these issues first.

4. It is contended by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the respondent, the State of Kerala, that the suit which has been instituted on the 8th of Thulam 1118 M.E. is barred by limitation. According to him the A