Judges : P.GOVINDA NAIR
Antony Joseph - Appellant
Versus
Vareethu Francis - Respondent
Case No : O. P. No. 719 of 1964
Decided On : 02/17/1965
Advocates Appeared :
G. Viswanatha Iyer; L. Mohanan; For Petitioner K. Hrishikesan Nair; P. Raman Menon; For 1st Respondent
Rent Control Act - Eviction - S.11(8) - S.11(10) - The court discussed the application of S.11(8) and its provisos, and the interpretation of 'building' in the context of the Act. The court held that S.11(8) applied to the case and reversed the findings of the revisional authority.
Fact of the Case:
The writ applicant sought possession of a part of a building rented to the respondents under S.11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. The District Judge reversed the findings of the appellate authority and set aside the eviction orders.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that S.11(8) applied to the case and reversed the findings of the revisional authority, remitting the case for further consideration.
Issues: Interpretation of 'building' in the context of S.11(8), application of the provisos, and reversal of findings by the revisional authority.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted 'building' in the context of the Act and held that S.11(8) applied to the case, reversing the findings of the revisional authority.
Final Decision: The court set aside the eviction orders and remitted the case for further consideration.
1. The writ applicant has been thwarted in his attempt to get possession of part of the building that he rented out to the respondents. I use the word 'building' here in its ordinary sense without any reference to the definition of the term contained in S.2(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. This 'building' consists of three rooms. The writ applicant is in possession of one of those rooms. He had rented out one room to the first respondent and had also rented out the remaining one to a third party. The application for eviction was based on S.11(8) of the above Act which reads as follows:
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building may, apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."
2. I must also refer to the provisos which would apply to this sub-section. These provisos are found after subjection (10) of S.11 and they read as follows:
"Provided that, in the case of an application under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it without weigh the advantage to the landlord:
Provided further that the Rent Control Court may, give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate."
3. The writ applicant succeeded both before the Rent Control Court as well as the appellate authority. I am not referring to the intermediate order of remand passed by the appellate authority and the revision petition from that order for it is unnecessary for the purpose of this case. A revision petition was taken before the District Judge from the final appellate order and the learned judge took the view that S.11(8) has no application and that it is S.11(3) that is attracted. He therefore called for certain findings from the appellate authority. These findings have been entered under three heads and those findings have been extracted in extenso by the District Judge in his order passed on revision, Ext. P-3. I shall refer to the relevant parts of those findings later on. Continuing the narration, the District Judge reversed the findings of the appellate authority that the landlord required the particular room of the building for his own accommodation bona fide and the further finding that it was possible for the respondents to get suitable accommodation elsewhere. He therefore allowed the revision petition and set aside the orders passed by the Rent Control Court as well as the appellate authority. This order is Ext. P-3 and that is the order that has been challenged before me.
4. The first point urged is that the revisional authority has erred in coming to the conclusion that S.11(8) has no application. This conclusion has been reached by the learned judge on the basis of a decision of the Madras High Court in A. Arunachala Naicker v. V. Gopal Stores represented by its Proprietor V. Gopal reported in 1955 M.L.J. 206. Mr. Justice Mack dealing with a provision, similar to S.11(8) of the Act, namely S.7(3) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949) came to the conclusion that the term ‘building' occurring in S.7(3)(c) of Act XXV of 1949 must be understood in the light of the definition of the term "building' contained in S.2(1) of that Act. With all respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to agree. The definition of the term 'building' in the Act is specifically made 'subject to the context'. It appears to me that in the context in which the word 'building' is used in S.11(8) it is capable of only one meaning namely 'the whole building' meaning thereby the whole structure. I say so for the reason that the sub-section refers to 'a part of a building'. Reading that part of t
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