The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for a proper and bona fide enquiry before land acquisition, the limitations on compulsory acquisition of property, and the impact of the absence of specific provisions in the Travancore Act on discrimination and violation of constitutional rights.

1. The appellants filed a writ petition to quash a declaration by the State of Kerala evidenced by Ex. P-5 under S.6 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act of 1089 and also four notices evidenced by Ex. P-1 to P4; and the writ petition has been dismissed by our learned brother, Madhavan Nair J. The appeal is directed against that order.

2. The relevant averments in the several affidavits filed in the writ petition, which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal, may now be adverted to.

3. The affidavit filed on 18th June 1962 in support of the writ petition avers that the land sought to be acquired has an extent of 4.78 acres abutting the National Highway at Kalamassery with jack trees, mango trees etc., and a substantial electrified residential building built on up-to-date lines fitted with modern sanitary fittings, garrage, cow-shed, water tank, etc.; that the buildings were leased to the fourth respondent, the Premier Tyres, Ltd., on a rent of Rs. 175 per mensem; that the appellants demanded a higher rent of Rs. 250 per month; that the Project Engineer of the company approached the first appellant to find out whether the appellants were willing to sell the property to the company; that the first appellant expressed her willingness to sell at a reasonable price; that the Project Engineer offered Rs. 75,000 and told the first appellant that in case the appellants were not willing to sell for that price, the directors of the company would move the State to acquire the property; that on 11th June 1962 Ex. P-1 to P-4 were served on the appellants; and that thereafter the appellants made enquiries and came to know of the declaration, Ex. P-5. The further averments in the same affidavit are that there was no public purpose for the acquisition, the purpose being only a private one, the use of the company; that the Travancore Land Acquisition Act does not contain provisions corresponding to S.38 to 43 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act and S.37 to 42 of the Cochin Land Acquisition Act authorising the State to acquire lands for purposes of companies; that "the declaration evidenced by Ex. P-5 is a colourable exercise of the power conferred upon " the State under S.6 of the Travancore Act; and that the declaration is " an abuse of the powers of the State ". Again, it is averred that the Travancore Act does not contain provisions similar to S.5A of the Indian Act or S.4 A of the Cochin Act; that the absence of such provisions in the Travancore Act has resulted in discrimination against owners of lands like the appellants; that the appellants are denied equality before the law and the equal protection of the law guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution; and that the provisions of the Travancore Act are violative of Art.14, 19(1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution. Lastly, it is averred that "the declaration evidenced by Ex. P-5 has not been made in good faith and evidence a colourable exercise of the power conferred upon the State under the Travancore Land Acquisition Act"; and that "the declaration has not been made with due care and attention."

4. The State and the company filed counter-affidavits, the former on 11th September and the latter on 9th September, 1963. The counter-affidavit of the State avers, inter alia, that the appellants' averment that the acquisition was not for a public purpose was wrong and unfounded; that in spite of the absence of provisions in the Travancore Act similar to S.38 to 43 of the Indian Act and the corresponding sections of the Cochin Act, the acquisition for a company still remained an aspect of acquisition for a public purpose; that there had not been any colourable exercise of the power of land acquisition by the State; that the State was satisfied that the functioning of the company was in the general interest of the public; that the question whether there was a public purpose or not was not justiciable; and that the motive of the company could not have vitiated the acquisition at the in