The main legal point established in the judgment is that the pendency of applications for pucca permit in a route is a bar to the grant of any temporary permit by the Regional Transport Authority.

1. The second respondent applied for a temporary permit on the route Changancherry-Ponthapuzha, a distance of 25 miles. The application was granted by the Regional Transport Authority by its order dated 13 91965 (Ex. P-2). The petitioner challenges the validity of this order mainly on three grounds: (1) that the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant a temporary permit as applications for pucca permit to operate in the route were pending on the date when the grant was made, (2) that the order of the Regional Transport Authority does not indicate the reasons which prompted the grant, and (3) that the permit was issued within one month of Ex. P-2 order and that was is violation of the provisions of R.177 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules.

2. As regards the first point it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that on 191965 one P. P. Philip had applied for a pucca permit, evidenced by Ex. R-7, in the route and therefore under the first proviso to S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant the permit.

But it is not clear that the application was for a permit in the route. The Regional Transport Authority had stated that the route covered by the application of P. P. Phillip is not the same as that covered by the grant to the second respondent. Therefore there is no substance in this contention of the petitioner.

3. It was argued for the petitioner that applications for pucca permit in the route were made on 6 91965 and 13 91965 in pursuance to the invitation by the Regional Transport Authority for applications for a pucca permit in the identical route and that the pendency of these applications was a bar to the grant of temporary permit under the first proviso to S.62. It may be recalled at this moment that the Regional Transport Authority heard the parties on 3 91965 and adjourned the case to 13 91965 for further discussion and decision. Ex. P-2 order was passed on 13 91965. The argument of Mr. Neelacanta Menon, appearing for the second respondent was that although the decision bears the date 13 91965 the parties were really heard on 3 91965 and the decision was taken on that date, but that the formal order alone was drawn up on 13 91965. He submitted that the order passed on 13 91965 has retrospective effect and should be considered as having been really passed on 3 91965. In support of this he referred me to the following passage in Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edition, page 73:

"Actus curiae neminem gravabit an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense; and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. In virtue of it, where a case stands over for argument; on account of the multiplicity of business in the court or for judgment from the intricacy of the question, the party ought not to be prejudiced by that delay, but should be allowed to enter up his judgment retrospectively to meet the justice of the case; and, therefore, if one party to an action die during a curia advisari vult, judgment may be entered nunc pro tune, for the delay is the act of the court, for which neither party should suffer". The maxim nunc pro tune means:

"A proceeding taken now for then, i. e., the proper time when it should have been taken; for example, special leave granted at the hearing to cross-appear against an order for a new trial...."

(See Wharton's Law Lexicon, 13th Edn. p. 603)

I am not quite sure whether this maxim can be applied to the facts of this case. In Evans v. Roes (1840-113 E. R.774 at 777) Lord Denman, C. J., observed:

"It is a power at common law, and by the ancient practice of the court, to prevent an unjust prejudice to the suitor by the dealy unavoidably arising from the act of court, and has been uniformly exercised, unless the dealy is imputable to the laches of the party applying. The effect of the judgment, when entered, may depend on the statute; but the power to enter it does not." In S