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1964 Supreme(Ker) 270

Judges : T.K.JOSEPH,T.C.RAGHAVAN
Popular Bank Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Sainuba Beevi - Respondent
Case No : A. S. No. 422 of 1961 from B. C. S. No. 3 of 1958 in B. C. P. No. 8 of 1956
Decided On : 10/19/1964
Advocates Appeared :
C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer; For Appellant A. S. Narayanan Asan; V. K. Hamsa; K. Shahul Hameed; A. Ismail Sait; For Respondent

The main legal point established is the application of the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in cases involving the capacity of individuals, particularly women, to understand and consent to legal documents, and the onus of proof in establishing such capacity.

Headnote:

Banking - Recovery Suit - Evidence Act, Section 114 - Muslim Woman's Capacity to Understand Business - Illiteracy and Purdah - Semi-Gosha Woman - Quasi-Purdah-Nishin - Protection of Purdah-Nishin Ladies - Presumption of Knowledge and Understanding of Document Contents - Onus of Proof - Decree Against 2nd Defendant and Her Properties

Fact of the Case:

The bank filed a suit for recovery of over Rs. 5,000 from the husband of the respondent, guaranteed by the respondent and secured by a mortgage of her immovable properties. The court decreed the suit against the husband but dismissed it against the respondent and her properties. The bank appealed for a decree against the respondent and her properties as well.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the respondent, a Muslim woman, claimed she had no knowledge of her husband's dealings with the bank and that she never guaranteed his debts. She alleged illiteracy and complete dependence on her husband for managing her affairs. The court examined the evidence and the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and concluded that the onus of proof was on the bank to establish the respondent's capacity to understand the documents she signed.

Issues: The issues revolved around the respondent's knowledge and understanding of the documents she signed, her illiteracy, and her claim of being a semi-gosha woman. The court also considered the onus of proof and the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the presumption of knowledge and understanding of document contents under Section 114 of the Evidence Act applies unless rebutted by evidence. The court also considered the protection of purdah-nishin ladies and the onus of proof in establishing a woman's capacity to understand business.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and a decree was granted against the 2nd defendant and her properties as well. The court directed that the decree passed against the 1st defendant would bind the 2nd defendant and her properties. No costs were awarded to the appellant in this Court.

Judgment :-

1. The appellant, a bank in liquidation, filed a suit for recovery of over Rs. 5,000 from the 1st defendant, the husband of the respondent, on an overdraft guaranteed by the respondent and secured by a mortgage of her immovable properties by deposit of title deeds; and Raman Nayar, J., decreed the suit with costs against the husband, but dismissed the same with costs against the respondent and her properties. In appeal the bank questions the correctness of the decision; and claims a decree against the respondent and her properties as well.

2. The respondent, a Muslim woman, averred in her written statement that she had no knowledge of her husband's dealings with the bank and that she never guaranteed his debts. She said that her title deeds were in the custody of her husband and that he might have handed them over to the bank without her knowledge. She pleaded further that she signed the memorandum of deposit of title deeds and the guarantee bond; but, she did so without knowing their contents, since her husband asked her to sign. Her further allegation was that she was an illiterate woman, completely dependant on her husband for the management of her affairs; and that she used to sign whatever papers he asked her to sign without caring to ascertain their nature or contents.

3. The only witness examined on the side of the bank was Pw.1, who was the Secretary of the bank at the relevant time. Raman Nayar, J. did not rely on the evidence of this witness, as the witness was a person of no character and as he was admittedly guilty of breach of trust of the bank's funds to the tune of about two lakhs of rupees. We do not think that any serious exception can be taken to this. The 2nd defendant was examined on commission. She deposed that she was following purdah; and that she signed the documents, because her husband wanted her to sign. She also stated that she did not know the contents of the documents when she signed them; and that she came to know about the guarantee to the bank only when she obtained notice in the suit. Again, she said that she was illiterate and that she did not know English or Malayalam.

4. Raman Nayar, J. says:

"Apart from the fact that she is illiterate, she is a Muslim woman and, even if she is strictly speaking not purdah-nishin, I think it would not be wrong to say that, generally speaking Muslim women in this State are comparatively ignorant and backward. In the case of such a person as the 2nd defendant, I should think that the ordinary presumption which may be drawn under S.114 of the Evidence Act, that a person who subscribes to a document subscribes to it with knowledge and understanding of its contents, is so attenuated as to be scarcely available, so that 1 think that the question whether what the 2nd defendant purported to do under Exx. P-4, P-5 and P-6 was her mental act must be decided on the evidence without the aid of any presumption arising either on the ground that she is a purdah-nishin woman on the one hand, or from the circumstance that she has admittedly signed those documents on the other."

Our learned brother says at another portion of the judgment that it might be that the 2nd defendant was not a purdah-nishin in the strict sense of the term; and concludes that having regard to the fact that the 2nd defendant was an illiterate and semi-gosha woman and a complete stranger to Pw.1, a man of affairs like him would not have put through a transaction with her without securing independent evidence of it in the shape of attestation by independent witnesses to the documents effecting or evidencing the transaction.

5. From these it is evident that our learned brother cast the onus of proof on the bank without drawing the presumption under S.114 of the Evidence Act, on the ground that the 2nd defendant, though not a purdah-nishin in the strict sense of the term, was a semi-gosha woman belonging to the Muslim community of this State, whose women are comparatively ignorant and backward. We









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