The main legal point established in the judgment is that the ademption of a legacy does not depend on the intention of the testator, but is a conclusion of law from certain events or conduct, as per the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

1. Appeal by defendants 1 & 2.

2. One Govinda Pillai, who was a Head Constable and after retirement a Vakil in Criminal Courts, had three fixed deposits in the Travancore Forward Bank, Ltd. under receipts Exts. D2, D3, and D4. The appellants claimed the amounts of those deposits as given to them under his last will, Ext. D8; and the respondents claim them as heirs on intestacy. The 1st plaintiff was his widow, the 2nd plaintiff is his nephew through a sister, and the 1st defendant a nephew and the 2nd defendant a niece through another sister. The 1st plaintiff died pending suit and additional plaintiffs 3 to 11, her grand children by pre-deceased daughter, have been substituted in her place. The Subordinate Judge found against the appellants, and decreed one half the suit amounts to plaintiffs 3 to 11 and the other half to Govinda Pillai's tavazhi inclusive of the 2nd plaintiff and the appellants. This appeal is against that decree.

3. The only question is whether there is a bequest in regard to the suit amounts in Ext. D8.

The concerned fixed deposits were made by the deceased long after the execution of the will, Ext. D8; and therefore the will makes no mention of those deposits. Nor is there a residuary gift to cover them.

4. The appellants rely on Clause.5 of Ext, D8 which reads:

They contend that the suit amounts represent the amounts under the passbook and decree bequeathed to them by the aforesaid clause. It is however conceded that the testator himself had collected all the amounts under the pass-book of the Anchal Savings Bank and under the decree and invested them in 1950/1951 in fixed deposits for two years in the Travancore Forward Bank, Ltd., Paravoor Branch, and on maturity of those deposits re-invested them in fixed deposits evidenced by Exts. D2 to D4, which form the subject-matter of this suit. On these facts, the Subordinate Judge held that the legacies under Clause.5 of Ext. D8 in favour of the appellants were specific legacies and that they had been adeemed when the testator collected the amounts himself and converted them into assets of a different character. Counsel for the appellants challenges the correctness of those findings and submits that the legacies were general legacies really amounting to legacies of the residuary assets of the testator. We cannot agree.

5. S.142 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, defines a specific legacy thus:

"Where a testator bequeaths to any person a specified part of his property, which is distinguished from all other parts of his property, the legacy is said to be specific."

and among the Illustrations given by the legislature are:

"2,000 rupees which I have in the hands of C"; "all my shares in the Imperial Bank of India."

There cannot be any doubt that the legacy of the amount in deposit in the Paravoor Anchal Savings Bank and the amount due under the decree in O.S. No. 141 of 1123 are specific legacies.

6. S.152 explains ademption thus:

"If anything which has been specifically bequeathed.... has been converted into property of a different kind, the legacy is adeemed; that is, it cannot take effect,..." and two of the statutory Illustrations thereof are:

"A bequeaths to B 'my gold chain'. A in his life time converts the chain into a cup. The legacy is adeemed."

"A bequeaths to B 'the sum of 1000 rupees in certain chest.' At the death of A, no money is found in the chest. The legacy is adeemed."

We think the above provisions in the statute are clear on the matter and do straightaway rope in the present case.

7. It was contended by counsel that the all-important consideration should be the intention of the testator, that it should be ascertained in the background that a'Court of construction shall try to avoid intestacy'. The short answer to the contention is that ademption of a legacy does not depend on the intention of the testator, but is a conclusion of law from certain events or conduct. In Humphreys v. Humphreys (30 Eng. Rep.85) Lord Thurlow, Lord Chancellor, was sati