Rightful possession by the true owner, even if forcibly regained, constitutes rightful possession in law, and subsequent loss of possession amounts to dispossession under Art.142 of the Indian Limitation Act.

1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit property. It originally belonged to one Mathur Ramaswami Iyer and was held on lease by the 3rd defendant; subsequently it was assigned to one Venkatachalam Iyer to whom the 3rd defendant attorned, by executing a pattomchit on the 4th November 1918, of which Ext. Al is the copy. It was alleged by the plaintiff, that on the 1st October, 1949, the 3rd defendant leased the property orally to her deceased sister Ammu, who was the mother of defendants 1 and 2. The 3rd defendant sued her for eviction in O.S. 585 of 1953 impleading defendants 1 and 2 in the course of the suit as her legal representatives upon her death. Though that suit was decreed by the first court, the lease was found against and the suit was dismissed in appeal. The rights of the 3rd defendant became vested in the plaintiff by assignment Ext. A2 dated the 11th July, 1955, and he has instituted the present suit. Defendants 1 and 2 contended, that the property was held on lease originally by Pazhanimalai, and upon his death it devolved on his daughters the 3rd defendant and Ammu, that Ext. Al was executed by the 3rd defendant in a representative capacity on behalf of Ammu also, that the plaintiff derived no interest under Ext. A2, that after the death of Ammu defendants 1 and 2 alone are entitled to one-half of the property, and that the suit is in any event barred by limitation. The court of first instance dismissed the suit, but on appeal the District Judge decided in favour of the plaintiff and gave him a decree for recovery of possession. The second appeal is by the first defendant.

2. The first question for determination is whether the 3rd defendant was solely entitled to the leasehold or not. The only document of lease in evidence is Ext. Al which recited, that anterior possession was with the 3rd defendant under Mathur Ramaswami Iyer, and provided, that on demand by Venkitachalam Iyer she would surrender possession on receipt by her of the value of improvements and execute a deed of release at her expense and that she and her improvements were liable for the due payment of pattom and interest thereon. There is no indication whatever in Ext. Al, that the 3rd defendant took the lease for any one except herself. As against this, there is the case of defendants 1 and 2 that Pazhanimalai was the original lessee of the property. Even the first court which dismissed the suit was not prepared to accept this plea. There is a fundamental discrepancy or even inconsistency between pleading and proof in this part of the case. In the written statement, Pazanimalai's lease was said to have been from one Chellappa Iyer whose identity itself was not attempted to be proved, and at the trial these defendants led evidence to prove that the lease was from the variyam of Dw. 2. The only other item of evidence which was relied on, was the statement in Ext. B1, a prior deposition of the 3rd defendant who died after this second appeal was filed. There was a controversy in the lower courts, that Ext. B1 could not be admitted in evidence without the 3rd defendant being confronted with it. It was argued, that the relevant statement in Ext. B1, constituting as it does an admission of the 3rd defendant, is admissible in evidence even without confronting her with it. It is unnecessary to resolve this controversy, although it may be observed, that the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the admissibility of such an admission; even granting that it is admissible, the statement relied on is not conclusive as to its import and is in any event insufficient to establish the contention of the defendants. The admission was, that at the time of the marriage of the 3rd defendant, there was a pattappura or thatched shed in the property which was built by Pazhanimalai; that was all. From this it was sought to be inferred, that the original lease, by whomsoever granted, wh