The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of S.14 of the Indian Limitation Act to exclude the period of the pendency of proceedings and the revival of the original order of confirmation of the sale, leading to the sale becoming absolute.

1. This second appeal by the 15th defendant arises in a suit for declaration of title and possession. In a chitty which was conducted by the first defendant as foreman, one Janaki Amma the predecessor-in¬interest of the plaintiff, and one Bhargavi the predecessor-in-interest of defendants 11 to 14, were subscribers. Janaki Amma obtained Ext. P-2 decree against the first defendant for money due to her under the chitty, in execution purchased the property in schedule A which belonged to him on the 14th Makarom,1120, and assigned her rights to the first plaintiff, or plaintiff shortly, who went into possession on the 31st Mithunam,1122. Bhargavi obtained Ex. P-9 decree against the first defendant for money due to her under the chitty, and in execution by Government for the Court fee payable a portion of the property in schedule A, specified as item 4 in schedule B, was purchased by the 15th defendant who is the appellant here. The plaintiff's obstruction to the delivery of possession to the 15th defendant was dismissed by order dated the 22nd Thulam,1125, which was confirmed by the High Court in revision on the 28th Mithunam,1125. The plaintiff then filed the present suit in the District Court on the 31st Karkadakam,1125, but on the plaint being returned it was presented in the Munsiff's Court on the 25th Kanni,1127, when more than one year had elapsed even after the order in revision was passed. It was held by the two courts below, that the property in schedule A having been sold earlier in execution of Ex. P2 decree, and having passed to the plaintiff, no interest remained with the first defendant which could pass to the 15th defendant under the purchase by him. The contention that the suit was barred by limitation was over-ruled and the suit was decreed.

2. The only two points urged in second appeal are, that the suit as instituted in the Munsiff's Court on the 25th Kanni,1127, was barred by limitation and that the sale in execution of Ex. P-2 decree has never been validily confirmed and so has not become absolute as to vest title in the plaintiff. The suit as filed in the District Court on the 31st Karkadakom,1125, was one for administration of the chitty assets, and objection was taken, by the 15th defendant that proper court fee had not been paid. The District Court went into this and called upon the plaintiff to state his valuation of the suit for payment of court fee and for determining jurisdiction, which it was ordered must be the same. The stated valuation being below Rs. 2000/- the plaint was returned and was presented in the Munsiff's Court. In overruling the plea of limitation, the two Courts have excluded the period of the pendency of these proceedings by applying S.14 of the Indian Limitation Act. It appears to me, that another approach is possible, for the District Court in which the plaint was presented was a court which had jurisdiction to try the suit. Under S.2 sub-S. (4) of the CPC., a District Court is defined as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the District, and under S.10 of the Travancore Civil Courts Act, 2 of 1084, which was in force at the time, "the District Court shall be deemed to be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction."

S. 9 of the same Act also has provided, that "the jurisdiction of a District Court extends, subject to the Rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature." There is nothing in the Code which has taken away the jurisdiction of the District Court to try original suits within its local limits. S.15 of the Code has enacted, that "every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it," but this is a provision which relates to the place of suing, & does not deprive the District Court of its jurisdiction to try original suits. Similarly it was not and could not be contended, that a decree of the District Court is v