The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of S.15 of the Limitation Act in the context of execution of decrees and the discretion of the decree holder to execute the decree in any manner he deems fit.

1. These two appeals arise from orders passed in execution of the decrees passed in O. S. Nos. 175 of 116 and 216 of 117 of the Kottayam Munsiff's court. The appellant in S. A.. No. 606 of 1959 is the third defendant in O. S. No. 175 and the same person figuring as the second defendant in O. S. No. 216 is the appellant in S. A. No. 607 of 959. The question that arises for decision is whether the decrees in these two cases are incapable of execution due to the bar of limitation. The decree in O. S. No. 175 was passed on 15-12-1941 and the decree in O. S. No. 216 on 27 51942. The execution petitions filed in the two cases were on 9 81956. These petitions admittedly were filed twelve years after the dates of the respective decrees and the contention, therefore, was urged by the appellant that execution cannot be had in either of the cases. This contention was repelled both by the execution court and by the lower appellate court.

2. The ground on which this contention was negatived by the execution court was that the appellant was concluded by the orders passed in the two cases respectively on 10 31956 and 3011956 when prior execution petitions dated 15 91955 were taken out in the two cases. In the order dated 10 91956, the reason given is this:

"It is seen that the execution was stayed from O. S.149 of 1124 and hence there is no limitation." The order dated 3011956 passed in O S. No. 216 is more elaborate and is in these terms:

"The contention that the decree is barred by limitation is not tenable, because the execution of the decree at least as against the attached property was stayed from O. S.149 of 1124. Since the decree holder's discretion in executing the decree in any manner that suits him cannot be questioned in stay (sic) in respect of the attached property would have limitation in respect of the whole execution proceedings."

This order is not very clear, but it appears to me that what it purports to say is that the decree having been stayed at least in regard to execution being proceeded with against the attached properties, S.15 of the Limitation Act is attracted and the decree-holder is entitled to the exclusion of the time during which the injunction was in force. This view is apparently based on the view taken by the Travancore High Court in a number of cases starting from the decision reported in Parameswaran v. Kaliamma Pillai (XIV TLJ. 501) and followed in the decisions reported in Parameswaran Unnithan v. Narayanan (XVIII TLJ. 792), Kochan v. Govinda Pillai (XVIII TLJ. 816) and Parameswaran Pillai v. Rudrayani Pillai (XXXI TLJ. 794). No decision either of the Travancore, Travancore-Cochin or of the Kerala High Court differing from the views expressed in these decisions has been brought to my notice during the course of the arguments. But counsel for the appellant relied mainly on a ruling of the Calcutta High Court reported in Lala Baijnath Prasad v. Nursingdas Guzrati (AIR. 1958 Cal. 1) and submitted that in view of the fact that earlier execution applications dated 15 91955 filed in the two cases contained a prayer only for proceeding against the attached property, the question whether personal execution could be had against the appellant in these cases was not the subject matter of enquiry and could not have been determined by the prior orders dated 3011956 and 10 21958. He, therefore, urged relying on the principles stated in the Calcutta decision that S.15 can operate only as a partial stay preventing the execution of the decree in so far as that portion of the decree which is stayed is concerned. His argument, therefore, is that assuming that execution can be had against the attached properties, the decree-holder should not be permitted to proceed against the person of the appellant. He is fully supported in this submission by the decision of the Calcutta High Court. This, however, is not the view taken by the Travancore High Court and that seems to have been the law in the area from which this cas